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ABSTRACT 
Sea piracy has infested the seven seas throughout history.  In modern 
times, the United States has paid little attention to piracy because the nation’s 
isolated vastness has protected the shipping industry from maritime crime.  But 
the events of 9/11 have changed the lens through which America views security.  
This thesis investigates modern day piracy and links between piracy and 
terrorism in order to determine implications for U.S. maritime security strategy.  
Specifically, the maritime environment in Southeast Asia and associated 
maritime security policies are researched because over the past 12 years, nearly 
fifty percent of the world’s sea piracy has occurred in that region.  The U.S. 
maritime security strategy is also evaluated so that informed policy 
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On today’s globalized planet, the vast oceans and crowded littoral 
waters present a dichotomy of essential personal and economic 
sustenance on the one hand, and on the other, the very real 
security challenge of immense areas of ungoverned or weakly 
controlled space.  For both dimensions of the challenge, maritime 
security is essential.1 Admiral William J. Fallon, United States 
Pacific Command. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING SEA PIRACY 
On 26 March 2003 off the coast of Sumatra, ten pirates approached in a 
speedboat and boarded the chemical tanker, Dewi Madrim.  Armed with machine 
guns and communicating via VHF handsets, the pirates disabled the ship’s radio 
and took the helm, steering the vessel on different courses and speeds for an 
hour.  The gang departed with cash, equipment and technical documents.  The 
captain and first officer were kidnapped; their fate remains unknown.2  Just 
another case of the economic piracy that has plagued Southeast Asian seas for 
centuries, or rehearsal for something much more sinister?  The argument of this 
thesis is that piracy tactics and trends represent a legitimate homeland security 
concern for the United States which must be addressed when developing 
maritime counter-terrorism policy.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate modern day piracy and 
links between piracy and terrorism in order to determine implications for U.S. 
maritime security strategy and policy.  Specifically, activities in the waters of 
Southeast Asia and associated maritime security policies will be researched 
because over the past 12 years nearly 50 percent of the world’s sea piracy 
occured in that region.3  The main concern of this thesis will be the relationship 
between the tactics used by sea pirates and the threat of maritime terror, and 
whether or not that relationship is relevant to U.S. maritime security.  This thesis 
                                            
1 William Fallon (Speech at Shangri La Dialogue, Singapore, 23 June 2005).  
2 “Peril on the Sea,” The Economist, 2 October 2003. 
3 International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual 
Report (Barking, UK: International Maritime Bureau, 2005). 
2 
will also assess the security polices emplaced to prevent piracy and maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia, and the implications for U.S. maritime security 
policy.   
This research will contribute to policy debates about the threat of maritime 
terrorism and the viability of maritime counter-terrorism policies and initiatives.  
Southeast Asian maritime security policy is important to the United States 
because of U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region.  While the 
primary objective of U.S. maritime security is to prevent a maritime terrorist 
attack, the prevalence of piracy events in Southeast Asia affords ample 
opportunity to analyze counter-piracy measures in force.  The analysis will help 
characterize pirate and terrorist tactics, many of which are shared, that can be 
effectively conflated under maritime security policy.  Addressing the pros and 
cons of combating piracy and maritime terrorism with the same policies is 
important for U. S. maritime security policy which aims to combat both threats. 
In addition to a functional comparison of piracy and maritime terrorism, a 
study of the Southeast Asian maritime environs will be important to U.S. maritime 
security strategists.  Geographically, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are 
shipping chokepoints, not unlike the narrows leading into major U.S. ports such 
as Seattle and San Francisco.   An investigation of the tactical issues relating to 
channel security will benefit U.S. Coast Guard and harbor authorities.  Unlike 
military forces and law enforcement agencies in the straits of Southeast Asia, 
U.S. maritime security forces have no territorial constraints with which to 
contend.  Nonetheless, jurisdictional authority between America’s law 
enforcement agencies is not black and white.  America’s long coastlines differ 
from the islands and shores of Southeast Asia which provide fertile and secluded 
habitat for pirates.  But the isolated vastness which has helped keep America’s 
shipping industry safe from commercial piracy may prove an inconsequential 
deterrent, or even an accommodation, for a maritime terrorist.  U.S. law 




instances of maritime narcotics and human smuggling, especially near the 
northern and southern border-coastlines, serve as sufficient reminders that 
America’s coasts are not impenetrable.   
There are other benefits to studying maritime security efforts in a region 
which has considerable pirate activity.  Technically, a study of security efforts in 
Singapore, one of the world’s major and most modern shipping ports, may yield 
direct implications for U.S. port authorities.  Some of Singapore’s security 
endeavors, such as participation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), are 
comparable to U.S. port security measures.  Politically, security in Southeast 
Asia is complicated by regional and international relations.  Clearly, U.S. 
maritime security policies are unilateral at the last line of defense, America’s 
coastline.  However, the first layer of defense is the foreign seaport.  It serves the 
direct interest of the United States to understand the security situation in 
Southeast Asia, especially since a substantial amount of incoming cargoes and 
vessels originate in that region.  
B. PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Chapter II of this thesis studies sea piracy and maritime terrorism in 
Southeast Asia.  Piracy in Southeast Asia dates back to the earliest maritime 
kingdoms and has long been a part of economic and political rivalries.  Nearly 
eradicated during the nineteenth century by the colonial powers, economic 
pirating has made a dramatic comeback in recent years. Though exact piracy 
statistics vary, the trend of attacks has generally increased in number and in 
violence over the past 5 to 10 years, with much of the upsurge attributed the 
Asian financial crisis.  By far, the two most common types of piracy are in-port 
theft of the opportunistic nature and at-sea “hit and run.”  Pirate gangs have 
undertaken short duration hijacks and long-term ship seizures, representing more 
serious but less frequent events.4   
In the past few decades the seas of Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand have witnessed the greatest number of attacks.  In the past when the 
                                            
4 Carolin Liss, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2003): 54-63. 
4 
primary fear was loss of property, piracy in Southeast Asia was played down in 
importance except by those directly affected, including the shipping and 
insurance businesses.  But the upward trends in violence which started in the 
mid-1990s have prompted concern.  Besides the threat of maritime terrorism, 
other related concerns also sprouted, such as environmental disaster.  
International tension has also been present, particularly in areas of state 
sponsored piracy or disputed waters such as the South China Sea.  
Contrary to the prevalence of piracy, maritime terrorism has been 
infrequent.  Even on the international scale, maritime terrorist events such as the 
hijacking of the cruise liner, Achille Lauro, in 1985, and the attacks on the USS 
Cole and French tanker, MV Limburg, in 2000 and 2002 respectively, have been 
relatively rare.5  However, the concern for maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia is 
genuine.  In the Straits of Malacca or Singapore, an extraordinary terrorist 
incident could have devastating regional and global economic consequences.   
As opposed to pirates who seek economic gains, maritime terrorist events 
are motivated more by political objectives.  On one side of the debate, scholars 
concede that piracy and terrorist tactics may overlap.  As example in Southeast 
Asia, secessionist groups have been suspected of using maritime kidnapping 
and ransom to raise funds.  Still, scholars point to the distinction in objectives - 
terrorists aim to inflict harm and call attention to their cause while pirates seek to 
avoid attention and inflict harm only as necessary to complete their mission - as 
the major reason why the threat of maritime terrorism should not be directly 
linked to the increased piracy threat.6   
                                            
5 The French tanker MV Limburg was rammed with a explosive-laden small-craft in the Gulf 
of Aden, Yemen in 2002, with in one week of the anniversary of the attack on the USS Cole. 
Adam Young and Mark Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2003): 270-76. 
6 The preponderance of academic literature researched claims that “motive” distinguishes 
modern day pirates from terrorists.  Four examples are cited here:  Liss, “Maritime Piracy,” 64; 
Vijay Sakhuja, “The Sea Muggers are Back in the Malacca Straits,” South Asia Analysis Group 
Paper, no. 1300 (23 March 2005); Michele Piercey, “Piracy and the Risks of Maritime Terrorism: 
How Significant are These Threats?” Australian Command and Staff College Geddes Papers, 
(2004): 64; Graham Ong, “Ships Can Be Dangerous Too: Coupling Piracy and Maritime 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Working Paper: International Politics and Security Issues, no. 1 (2004): 14. 
5 
On the other hand, piracy in Southeast Asia is likely to continue and 
recent trends of violence and kidnap-for-ransom may serve as a portent of 
maritime terror.  Terrorist groups are unpredictable and should not be 
underestimated.  Al Qaeda, which targeted the USS Cole and the MV Limburg off 
of Yemen, has connections to terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and is believed 
to own a number of freighters.7  Al Qaeda is suspected of having a maritime 
terror strategy that includes use of diving, various gases, and surface attacks.  In 
2001, the Southeast Asian regional terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 
planned to attack a U.S. warship docked in Singapore.  In 2004, the Abu Sayyaf 
group (ASG) was responsible for the bombing of Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, 
killing approximately 100 people.  As states tighten land and air transportation 
security and crackdown on sponsorship of terrorism, terrorists may turn 
increasingly to the maritime domain to raise monies and avoid law enforcement, 
and the success of Southeast Asian pirates may influence partnerships.8   
A serviceable nexus between pirates and terrorists is unproven, but the 
link between piracy and terrorism tactics is a definite concern for Southeast Asian 
security strategists.  Additionally, as terrorists seek to diversify operations in the 
future, tangible links may develop.  Piracy may play a facilitating role if terrorists 
seeking expertise in the maritime theater collaborate and cooperate with sea 
pirates to conduct attacks against critical economic and political targets.  The 
plausible links between piracy and maritime terror create implications for 
maritime security that can not be ignored when devising security policies in 
Southeast Asia and the United States.   
C. MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Chapter III of this thesis researches maritime security in Southeast Asia. 
The post 9/11 anxiety over terrorism coupled with the potential threat posed by 
maritime terrorists has heightened state concerns over piracy and enhanced 
                                            
7 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 
(November/December 2004). 
8 Catherine Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment,” Institute 
of Defense and Strategic Studies, no. 74 (March 2005): 12-29. 
6 
regional maritime security in general.9  At the heart of the maritime security 
question in Southeast Asia, is whether or not counter-piracy and counter-
maritime terror policies can or should be conflated.  Piracy and terrorism have 
many different causes, objectives, and tactics and thus may require different 
responses.  Even the efforts to define the two acts have been problematic for 
international policymakers and lawmakers alike.  If piracy and terrorism are fused 
together into a general maritime security threat, smaller and developing states 
may benefit from international counter-terrorism efforts.  But common piracy and 
armed robbery, which accounts for approximately 90 percent of Southeast Asia’s 
maritime crime, may not be covered by international conventions such as the 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).  Other issues such as joint jurisdiction 
and appropriate use of force also remain for the most part undecided.  Some 
scholars argue that while measures aimed at operational similarities may be 
effective in the short-term, long-term solutions aimed at eliminating the root 
causes of piracy and maritime terrorism must be unique.10 
Other scholars admit that long-term solutions aimed at eliminating piracy 
and terrorism have not been applied, but contend that the immediacy of both 
threats demands a decisive and integrated maritime security strategy.  First, 
cooperative efforts will benefit resource-limited states.  Second, the 
complications involved in the legal aspect of coupling piracy and terrorism have 
been overstated.  Formalizing security agreements to counter piracy and 
terrorism will create beneficial operational links between Southeast Asian forces 
and blue water navies.  The real challenge is not in the coupling of the two 
crimes, but rather in the development of arrangements that alleviate suspicion 
and foster cooperation.11   
 
                                            
9 William Carpenter and David Wiencek, eds., Asian Security Handbook 3rd ed. (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 18. 
10 Young and Valencia, 276-280. 
11 Ong, “Ships Can Be Dangerous Too,” 18-20. 
7 
D. MARITIME SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Chapter IV of this thesis offers an overview of U.S. maritime security.  The 
attack on the USS Cole coupled with the ingenuity of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
one year later, have opened America’s eyes to the unimaginable.  One of the 
United States’ worse fears is that maritime terrorists will hijack a supertanker and 
detonate it in port.  The psychological and economic consequences from a 
supertanker, cruise liner or smuggled WMD exploding in a major city harbor 
could be disastrous.  Even if terrorists use more traditional methods, such as 
ramming a small, explosive-laden boat into a liquid natural gas tanker, the attack 
could be cataclysmic.   
The U.S. charter for ensuring maritime security under the 2005 National 
Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) is immense in scope.  The NSMS seeks 
to protect all the world’s maritime trade from all threats.  In addition to preventing 
maritime terror, the NSMS specifically aims to curtail piracy and maritime crime in 
hope of severing any tactical or financial links to terrorism.12   Much of the debate 
in Washington DC centers on the extent to which prevention must rely on 
technical solutions versus intelligence gathering and sharing, as well as 
cooperative and jurisdictional issues.  Historically, piracy has attracted little 
interest in U.S. maritime security policy even though a small number of U.S. 
flagged ships have been pirated in Southeast Asian waters.13   Though economic 
piracy has not plagued American shores, incidences of black marketing, 
narcotics trafficking, and human smuggling may point to vulnerabilities in our 
coastal defenses similar to the vulnerabilities of Southeast Asia.   
E. THESIS METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will undertake a qualitative, historical study of piracy in 
Southeast Asia over the past 10 to 15 years in order to determine (1) tactical 
trends in piracy; (2) tactical relationships or similarities between piracy and 
                                            
12 National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2005), 5. 
13 As example, the U.S. flagged tanker, Ranger, was boarded and robbed of $23,000 of 
Singapore in 1991 and the Falcon Countess lost $19,000 in 1984 while transiting the Malacca 
Straits. William Carpenter and David Wiencek, eds., Asian Security Handbook 2000 (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 95. 
8 
maritime terrorism; and (3) major issues involved with piracy and maritime terror 
that must be addressed by Southeast Asian proposed and enacted security 
policies.  This thesis will study the individual and cooperative efforts of Southeast 
Asian states in combating piracy and maritime terror, in attempt to determine the 
effectiveness of current policies in dealing with piracy and maritime terror issues. 
This thesis will then review U.S. maritime security strategy to determine security 
concerns which parallel those of Southeast Asia.  Finally, policy implications for 
the NSMS will be drawn.   
This study will not attempt to situate maritime security policies in the 
totality of the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, but rather will address the maritime 
environment on a unitary level, acknowledging that it is just one critical 
component of the homeland defense and security effort.  This study will not 
provide a detailed analysis of international law.  The focus will be on the 
conceptual and procedural measures involved in the development of maritime 
security policy, rather than the legal aspects of prosecuting perpetrators.  
Similarly, this thesis will not focus on the consequence management of maritime 
terror.  Although response and recovery are important components of security 
policy, the focus of this thesis will be on prevention measures. 
9 
II. PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
 
Figure 1.   Southeast Asia (CIA.GOV Publications/Maps, accessed June 2006) 
 
10 
This chapter will address piracy and maritime terror in general terms to 
familiarize readers with both phenomena.  For case study, Southeast Asia will be 
analyzed because its maritime domain provides a historical perspective and 
modern day view of piracy.  Southeast Asia’s generous amount of piracy acts 
comprises a wide range of tactics, allowing for a trend analysis.  Significant 
worldwide piracy events and trends will be compared to the Southeast Asian 
situation to ensure that the main aspects of piracy have been studied prior to 
discussion on maritime security policies in follow-on chapters.   
Maritime terrorism will be studied, also with focus on Southeast Asia.  
Maritime terror attacks occur far less frequently than pirate attacks, so the 
subject will be approached from a more narrative than analytical angle.  The fact 
that a number of known terrorist groups reside in Southeast Asia has stimulated 
plenty of discussion with regard to maritime terror.  Accordingly, a variety of 
maritime terror scenarios, along with vulnerabilities and threats, will be 
presented.  Finally, this chapter will deduce the analyses of piracy and maritime 
terror into a list of significant issues which will serve as a basis for evaluating 
Southeast Asia’s maritime security policy in Chapter III. 
A.  PIRACY 
As long as valuables have been transported by sea, pirates have been 
around to steal them.  Rome was the first naval power to devise a successful 
anti-piracy plan.  In 67 B.C., Pompey the Great created a maritime patrol force to 
protect Roman commerce.  Years later, in 10 A.D., Emperor Augustus applied 
Rome’s full naval power against the maritime scourge, effectively negating the 
pirate threat in the Mediterranean for the next three hundred years.  Historians 
have written much about the pirates of the sixteenth and seventeenth century.  
Names such as Henry Morgan, Blackbeard (Edward Teach), and Captain William 
Kidd are prominent in many a swashbuckling tale.  Most pirates of this genre 
were originally privateers, commissioned (primarily by the English) to seize the 
gold-laden Spanish ships en route to the New World.  When the conflict between 
England and Spain ended in 1692, privateers who wished to maintain their 
 
11 
seafaring lifestyles were forced to expand their activity.  Hence the “Golden Age 
of Piracy” (1692-1725) was born, spreading from the Caribbean to the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, and even the Red Sea.14    
Pirates of the Golden Age attacked towns as well as ships.  If their catch 
was merchandise rather than precious metals or coin, pirates employed land-
based fences, many legitimate, to broker the loot.  Over time the Golden Age of 
Piracy died out as naval forces grew, merchant ships carried less treasure and 
more arms, and a series of pardons were offered to pirates to quit their ways.  
But piracy did not die.  Except for a brief respite during World War II, the threat of 
piracy has remained.  In recent years, the piracy threat off the coasts of 
Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America has even elevated.  Modern pirates 
are often skilled, violent, and connected to shore-based organized crime.15  
There is nothing golden about today’s piracy. 
1. Defining Modern Day Piracy 
Most scholars define piracy as a criminal tactic that targets maritime 
resources, trade, or personnel for economic interests (financial gain).  According 
to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy 
is “any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends … on the high seas against another ship … outside the jurisdiction 
of any state.”16   The International Maritime Organization, an organ of the United 
Nations established in 1948, recognizes the UNCLOS definition of piracy.  
Additionally, the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO, has defined armed 
robbery against ships as “any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of ‘piracy,’ directed against a 
ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State’s 
jurisdiction over such offences.”17   
                                            
14 Jack Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2000), 1-5. 
15 Gottschalk, 10-20, 84. 
16 Carpenter, Asian Security Handbook 2000, 91. 
17 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2005). 
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The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established an 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 1981 to act as a focal point for countering 
all maritime crime and malpractice.  The IMO has urged all governments, 
interests, and organizations to cooperate and exchange information with the 
IMB.18  As such, the IMB is the world’s foremost agency for exchanging and 
compiling information on maritime crime.  The IMB defines piracy and armed 
robbery as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent 
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability 
to use force in the furtherance of that act.”  The most obvious difference between 
the UNCLOS and IMB definitions is that the IMB makes no territorial 
distinctions.19  The IMB has categorized armed robbery and piracy together so 
that the practical threat of piracy may be accounted for as accurately as possible.  
Technically, if an attack occurs within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, the 
event is only classified as piracy if that nation’s penal code criminalizes it as 
such.  But for the purposes of reporting, the broad IMB definition allows for a 
more comprehensive picture of maritime crime.  Acknowledging the legal 
distinction between piracy and armed robbery, this thesis will follow the IMB 
standard of combining the two incidents and the practice of interchanging both 
terms.      
In 1992, the IMB established a Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in Malaysia 
specifically to combat the alarming increase in piracy, especially in Southeast 
Asia.  The PRC’s key functions include (1) issuing daily status reports on piracy 
and armed robbery; (2) reporting piracy and armed robbery at-sea incidents to 
law enforcement and the IMO; (3) facilitating the apprehension of pirates via 
communication and coordination with authorities; (4) providing assistance to 
ship-owners and crews whose vessels have been attacked; and (5) publishing a 
weekly piracy update and comprehensive quarterly and annual reports.20 
                                            
18 IMO Resolution A 504 (XII) (5) and (9) , 20 November 1981.  Ibid., 2; “Piracy and Armed 
Robbery at Sea,” Focus on IMO (January 2000), 7-8.  
19 Ibid. 
20 The PRC system is based on reported incidents only. International Maritime Bureau, 
Piracy Reporting Center at <www.icc-ccs.org/prc/services.php> accessed May 2006. 
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There are five main types of piracy currently occurring in waters around 
the globe:21 
1)  Thefts and attacks on vessels at anchor or pier side.  A common 
type of attack is low-level armed robbery that occurs while ships are 
docked or moored.  Perpetrators, normally armed with small arms 
or knives, approach via small, high speed boats, seeking cash or 
other high-value personal items.   
2)  Robbery of vessels at sea.  Piracy at sea typically involves more 
violence because crews are detained while the attackers ransack 
the vessel.  These type of attackers are usually well-armed and 
well-organized.   
3)  Hijacking of vessels.  Most hijacked vessels are converted for 
illegal trade.  The hijacked vessel’s cargo is offloaded and sold (or 
used by the pirates themselves).  The vessel is then falsely re-
registered and issued fraudulent documents, enabling the on-load 
of new cargo, which in turn is usually sold on the black market.  
This type of “phantom ship” operation is typically perpetrated by 
highly trained and heavily armed pirate groups. 
4)  Yacht Piracy.  “Yachtjacking” is an attack against a private vessel, 
targeting cash and marketable merchandise.  This type of piracy is 
most common in seas where numerous private, well-stocked yachts 
sail, for instance the Caribbean.    
5)  Kidnap-for-ransom.  Pirates board a vessel for robbery but also 
kidnap senior crew members.  Later, ransom is demanded from 
ship owners in exchange for safe return of the crew members.  This 
type of piracy is normally conducted by well-organized groups such 
as pirate gangs, criminal syndicates, or terrorist groups.    
2. Consequences of Modern Day Piracy  
The consequences of piracy can be assessed on different levels.  On the 
individual level, piracy is a direct threat to lives and welfare of all seafarers, 
including professional and recreational.  From 1991 to 2001, 2,058 mariners 
were taken hostage, 280 were killed, 275 were injured, and 157 assaulted.22  
However, the human cost of pirate attacks is rarely the motivation behind policy 
or publicity for two reasons.  Firstly, pirate attacks usually are directed at low-
                                            
21 Except type number 5. Peter Chalk, Non-military Security and Global Order (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), 58-59. 
22 Peter Chalk, “Piracy Emerges as Modern-day Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, 1 May 
2002. 
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visibility targets in areas of the world which piracy is already reputed.23  The 
shock effect of pirates harming a crew of maritime merchants off the coast of 
Africa pales in comparison to a group of terrorists hijacking a passenger plane.  
Secondly, pirates are normally after economic gains.  Though pirates sometimes 
resort to violence in the accomplishment of their goals, violence is neither their 
primary motivation nor aim. 
On the economic level, piracy has definite consequences.  The tangible 
losses due to piracy are relatively insignificant.  A 1997 estimate placed material 
costs at just under $73 million.24  The entire toll is more difficult to calculate 
because in addition to material losses there are immeasurable costs including 
missed business opportunities, out of commission crews and ships, and elevated 
insurance and security requirements.  The Asia Foundation estimated total global 
costs as high as $16 billion per year.25  Other estimates of the economic impact 
of piracy are as low as $1 billion per year.26  If other maritime crime - 
merchandise smuggling, narcotics trafficking, arms dealing, etc. - is grouped with 
piracy, the economic cost is much higher.   
Piracy can also have other negative effects.  Many fear that environmental 
consequences are potentially disastrous.  If pirates attack an oil tanker and set 
the ship adrift (crew incapacitated or forced overboard) on a congested trade 
route, a high potential for environmental disaster could exist.27  Piracy can also 
have political impacts when it involves instances of state sponsorship, law 
enforcement complicity, governmental corruption, or military participation.28 
 
                                            
23 Chalk, Non-military Security, 66. 
24 “Costs of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy and the Benefits of Working Together,” in 
Proceedings of APEC High-Level Meeting on Maritime Security and Cooperation (Manila: 
Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, September 2003). 
25 Estimates for Malacca Strait traffic range from 50,000 ships per year to 200 ships per day 
(73,000).  50,000 per year is presented as a conservative estimate.  “IMO to Take Straits 
Initiative,” Proceedings from Council, 93rd Session, 15-19 November 2004; James Carafano and 
Alane Kochems, eds., “Making the Sea Safer,” Heritage Foundation Working Paper (2005): 15. 
26 Chalk, “Piracy Emerges.”  
27 Chalk, Non-military Security, 67. 
28 Chalk, “Piracy Emerges.”  
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B. PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Throughout recorded history, Southeast Asia has been notoriously 
plagued with pirates.  However, it was the nineteenth century when the East 
Indies spice trade reached its peak, European and Chinese trade mushroomed, 
and Japan opened to Western commerce, that piracy around the Malacca Straits 
reached a pinnacle.  In the early twentieth century, piracy declined in Southeast 
Asia when modern imperial navies exercised their substantial upper hand to 
control the seas.  Though always present at some level, the rise of piracy at the 
end of the last century is well documented.  The numerical rise of incidences may 
now be leveling or reversing, but the characteristics of many of the attacks have 
signaled a disturbing trend of violence.   
1. The Rise of Modern Day Piracy  
The 50,000-plus ships per year which transit the Malacca Straits provide 
ample and lucrative targets for pirates.  The traffic congestion facilitates pirate 
approach and cover.29  Between 1991 and 2001, Southeast Asia accounted for 
fifty-seven percent of all reported pirate attacks, actual and attempted.  The 
massive increase in commercial traffic during the 1990’s globalization boom, 
combined with hard-to-police shorelines, may explain the regional concentration.  
Another contributory factor may have been the termination of the Cold War which 
reduced the number of superpower and Western naval vessels in Southeast Asia 
while simultaneously flooding the market with illegal arms.30  The economic fall-
out from the 1997 Asian financial crisis served to promote maritime crime, 
especially in Indonesia which from 1996 to 2001, accounted for over a quarter of 
all international maritime assaults.31   
In addition to the resurgence of piracy in Southeast Asia, there have also 
been geographical shifts.  In the early 1990’s, the Malacca Straits and proximate 
waters were identified by the IMB as the most dangerous in the world, accounting 
                                            
29 Catherine Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia; New Trends, Issues, and Responses,” 
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Working Paper, no. 89 (October 2005): 3-4. 
30 Liss, “Maritime Piracy,” 58. 
31 Chalk, “Piracy Emerges,” 
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for roughly half of all pirate attacks.  The reduced speed limits render vessels 
vulnerable to pirates in fast, maneuverable craft.   In the mid-1990’s, Southeast 
Asian piracy shifted away from the Malacca Straits and towards the South China 
Sea, Hong Kong and Macau, and the so-called HLH “terror triangle.”32   From 
1993 to 1995 over fifty percent of Southeast Asia’s reported pirate attacks took 
place in these three areas.  In the late 1990’s, Indonesian territorial waters 
gained notoriety for being the most prone to pirate attack.  In 2004, Indonesia’s 
waters accounted for 93 incidents, more than twenty-five percent of reported 
world wide attacks.33  The Indonesian zones near Bintan and Batam islands 
have become well-known “black-spots” for piracy gangs and crime syndicates.  
As shipping approaches the Singapore Strait, pirates take advantage of the 
slowed and concentrated targets.34  
The shifts in geographic prevalence of Southeast Asia’s piracy occurred 
for a variety of reasons.35  Security measures were increased in the Malacca 
Straits when the IMB began highlighting the dangers in the early 1990’s.   The 
Chinese, who were suspected of being complicit with pirates in the South China 
Sea as a furtive method to assert sovereignty, later cracked down on black 
market trade.  The Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 spurred a wave of 
economic piracy, especially in the vicinity of hard-hit Indonesia.  The crisis also 
detracted from the Indonesian government’s capacity to patrol its expansive 
shores.  Pirate reporting inaccuracies and omissions may have also influenced 
trend results.36  
                                            
32 HLH “terror triangle” represents an extended zone bounded by Hong Kong, Luzon (the 
Philippines), and Hainan Island (China). 
33 International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau, <http://www.icc-
ccs.org/prc/services.php> accessed May 2006. 
34 Anthony Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organization,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 1 June 2004.  
35 Chalk, Non-military Security, 68-70. 
36 The IMB suspects that many incidents go unreported.  In 2004, PRC officials estimated 
that authorities were not alerted to fifty percent of all incidents.  Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia.”  
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2. Piracy Incidents 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
58 85 130 102 94 167 257 167 165 187 170 118 
 
Table 1.   Piracy Incidents in Southeast Asia37 
 
Table 1 illustrates the amount of piracy events in Southeast Asia over the 
past 12 years.  Ships in Southeast Asia’s waters remain susceptible to four of the 
five types of piracy described in Section A1 of this chapter.  Yachtjacking is not 
typical of Southeast Asia.38  Most common in Indonesian waters are attacks on 
harbored and anchored vessels.  In 2004, 51 of 72 and in 2005, 56 of 67 actual 
attacks in Indonesia fell under this category.39  
Attacks against vessels at-sea or “hit and run” tactics are also common in 
Southeast Asian waters.  These types of attacks require more organization and 
resources than attacks on anchored vessels.  Armed pirates, usually at night, 
come along side a ship and board via grappling hooks.  The value of stolen 
goods in “hit and run” attacks averages between $10,000 and $20,000.40   In 
2005, this type of tactic accounted for 22 of 81, twenty-seven percent of 
Southeast Asia’s actual attacks.  See Table 2. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
51 32 26 55 42 22 
 
Table 2.   Reported At-sea Actual Attacks in Southeast Asia41 
                                            
37 Numbers include South China Sea, Vietnam, and HLH area. International Maritime 
Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2005). 
38 Only 10 of 276 incidents involved yachts, speedboats or other passenger ships. 
International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2005). 
39 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2004 and 
2005). 
40 Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia.” 
41 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, (2000; 2001; 
2003; 2004; 2005); Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report 
2002 (London: International Maritime Organization, 2003). 
18 
Hijacking of vessels at sea is less common than the first two varieties of 
piracy, but far more serious. An illustrative example of hijacking at-sea occurred 
in September 1998, when the Japanese owned vessel Tenyu disappeared in the 
Malacca Straits en route to South Korea with a cargo of 1,500 tons of aluminum.  
The ship reappeared in December in a Chinese port with a new name and an 
Indonesian crew.  The fate of the original crew - thirteen Chinese and two South 
Koreans - is unknown.42  In 2003, postulated to be a result of China’s crackdown 
on black market activity, zero hijackings were reported.  In April of 2005, armed 
pirates ordered a tin-laden cargo ship into a southern Malaysia port, unloaded 
the cargo, and then ordered the ship back to sea where they escaped via a 
speedboat.43 
Hijacking involves a more complex network than mere robbery at-sea 
because pirates must either transfer the ship’s cargo to another vessel, or unload 
at a complicit port.  Pirates then require market access for the stolen cargo, 
which is usually gained via a crime syndicate or corrupted authority.  Hijacked 
vessels can be transformed into “phantom ships” and used in various maritime 
crimes, such as pirate attacks, smuggling of goods or humans.  This practice is 
becoming a less common occurrence in Southeast Asia.  However, the trend of 
attacking and/or hijacking tugboats is increasing.  In 2003 and 2004, ten of the 
thirteen and five of eight hijacked vessels were tugboats, respectively.44  This 
trend has worried some observers who fear a connection to terrorism due to the 
ease in which tugboats can approach larger vessels. 
In 2005 there were thirteen kidnaps-for-ransom worldwide, the most 
violent brand of piracy.45  Pirates normally takeover a vessel (often a small 
                                            
42 Donald Freeman, The Straits of Malacca; Gateway or Gauntlet? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
UP, 2003), 187-188. 
43 Anti-shipping Activity Message, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 22 April 2005. 
<http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/maritime/index/> accessed May 2006. 
44 Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 7-8; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2005). 
45 Kidnap-for-ransom is considered more violent than the more common hostage holding 
because often times crewmembers are held hostage while the pirates raid the vessel.  When the 
pirates depart, the hostages are then released or can escape, as opposed to kidnapping where 
victims are forced to depart with the pirates. 
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merchant craft or tugboat) then abduct one or two senior crewmembers.  It is 
suspected by the IMB that many kidnappings may go unreported because ship 
owners want to avoid industry backlash for giving into demands.46  On March 12, 
2005, thirty-five pirates, armed with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades 
(RPG), boarded an Indonesian tanker in the Malacca Straits.  The pirates 
kidnapped the master and chief engineer and held them captive until ransom was 
subsequently paid.  Two days later armed pirates boarded a Japanese tug in the 
Malacca Straits, kidnapping the master, chief engineer and third engineer.  The 
men were released, but Japan’s Foreign Ministry did not comment on whether 
ransom was paid.47 
3. Trends in Piracy in Southeast Asia 
SULU SEA-PHILIPPINES-MALAYSIA: Malaysian tug (EAST 
OCEAN 2) and barge (SARINTO 1), sailing from Sabah to Solomon 
Islands with construction material, was attacked 11 Apr [2004] at 
1900 local time near Taganak Island by 8 to 10 heavily armed 
gunmen in black uniforms and masks. Three crew were kidnapped 
and some electronics stolen from the tug before the attackers left in 
the direction of Philippine waters after forty minutes. Attackers, 
armed with M16 rifles equipped with grenade launchers, are 
believed to be members of Abu Sayyaf. As of 14 Apr, no ransom 
demands had been made for the three abducted crew. Tug barge 
and remaining crew returned safely to Sabah.48 
As the prefatory excerpt suggests, the most significant trend in Southeast 
Asian piracy over the past decade has been the use of violent tactics.  While the 
majority of pirate attacks continue to be armed robbery attributed to small-scale 
criminals, more complex operations such as hijackings and kidnap-for-ransom 
have emerged, indicating a shift to planned organizational tactics as opposed to 
opportunistic, solitary tactics.  The IMB suspects that a variety of Indonesian and 
Malaysian pirate gangs and crime syndicates are responsible for the hijacking 
                                            
46 Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 10; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2005). 
47 Sakhuja, “Sea Muggers”; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, (2005). 
48 The Sulu Sea is a known operating area of the ASG near the Philippines.  The ASG later 
demanded a ransom of $54,000 for the three crewmembers. Anti-shipping Activity Message, 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 11 April 2004; Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia.”  
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attacks around the Malacca Straits.49  Unfortunately, little is known about the 
composition and structure of pirate gangs, including their operations and 
relationships to syndicated crime.50  Table 3 suggests that violence still accounts 
for a significant portion of pirate activity in Southeast Asia, but encouragingly has 
been tapering off in the past three years. 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
Actual At-sea Attacks 61 48 22 
Hostages Taken 151 120 119 
Crews - Threatened 32 9 5 
- Assaulted 7 6 1 
- Injured 18 8 13 
- Murdered 13 6 - 
- Missing  22 18 12 
- Kidnapped NA 43 13 
 
Table 3.   Recent Piracy Violence in Southeast Asia51 
 
The increase in violence, organization, and complexity of the pirate 
enterprise is being facilitated by a concomitant modernization of the tools of the 
trade.  Using modern Night Vision Devices (NVD) surveillance gear, Global 
Positioning System (GPS) navigation equipment, and access to the Internet, 
pirates can target specific ships with easy-to-sell cargo, ranging from metal 
ingots to electronic goods.  Offensively, RPG’s, rockets, and automatic weapons 
present a formidable threat to all commercial vessels and even small patrol craft.   
 
 
                                            
49 Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 11; Davis, “Piracy in Southeast.”  
50 Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, “Conclusion: Towards an Agenda for Piracy 
Research,” in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses,”  (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 162. 
51 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, (2003; 2005). 
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Top of the line speedboats and state of the art telecommunications allow for swift 
and coordinated operations.52  At-sea modern day piracy has become a 
systematic operation in Southeast Asian waters.  
C. SIGNIFICANT PIRACY EVENTS FROM OTHER SEAS 
ALERT Somalia - NE and Eastern Coast 
Forty one incidents have been reported since 
15.03.05. Heavily armed pirates are now attacking 
ships further away from the coast. Ships not making 
scheduled calls at Somali ports are advised to keep 
at least 200 nm from the Somali coast. 
 
Figure 2.   Standing IMB Piracy Alert, April 200653 
 
The pirate violence in Southeast Asia corresponds to the worldwide trend 
in piracy.  In 2005, 23 vessels were hijacked, the highest number since 2002 and 
the second highest number ever recorded by the PRC.  Also in 2005, 440 
crewmembers were taken hostage, the highest number since the IMB began 
keeping statistics in 1992.  Hostage incidents were predominately in Indonesia, 
Somalia, and Nigeria.   Reportedly, no hostages or crewmembers were killed in 
2005, but twelve remain missing.  Also congruent with the trend in Southeast 
Asia, the total number of worldwide piracy attacks declined.   There were 276 
attacks in 2005, the lowest number recorded since 1999.  The IMB credits the 
drop in attacks to increased awareness, anti-piracy watches by shipmasters in 
risk-prone areas, and pro-active law enforcement by governments against armed 
robbery in ports and at-sea.54 
In the past few months Somalia has headlined international news as a 
piracy hotspot.  A country in anarchy, Somalia’s decade-long civil war has spilled 
into its territorial waters.  Arms trading, narcotic trafficking, human smuggling, 
kidnap-for-ransom, robbery at-sea, illegal fishing and dumping plague the coast 
                                            
52 Liss, “Maritime Piracy,” 62-64. 
53 The IMB recorded 35 attacks off Somalia in 2005, compared to just two in 2004. “Iraq 
Declared New Piracy Hotspot,” ICC Commercial Crime Services News, 31 January 2006. 
54 Ibid. 
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line.55  Somali pirates tend to use kidnapping tactics, holding the crews until ship 
owners pay ransom.  The issue of Somali piracy was highlighted by the attack on 
a cruise liner in November, 2005.  Seabourn Spirit, carrying 302 passengers, was 
fired upon by RPG’s and machine guns from two pirate boats.  The fact that the 
liner was 100 miles off the coast raised eyebrows because small-boat attacks 
usually occur closer to shore.  The Somali coastline is considered one of the 
most dangerous in the world.56   
Earlier this year, the USS Winston Churchill, after numerous warnings 
were ignored, fired two salvos of warning shots and aggressively crossed the 
path of a hijacked vessel in order to apprehend the suspected pirates.57    More 
recently, as part of a Dutch-led coalition task force, the USS Cape St. George 
and USS Gonzales returned fire on a group of Somali pirates twenty-five miles 
off the coast.  The brashness of the pirates mirrors the upward trend in violence 
seen in the Southeast Asian waters.  Engaging coalition warships from a small 
skiff also demonstrates the unpredictability of pirates operating off the Somali 
coast.58  Hopefully, the two incidents above are isolated and not an omen that 
aggressive pirate resistance to military and law enforcement patrols is spreading.  
The instability in Iraq also led to ten piracy events in 2005, compared to 
zero in 2004.  Attacking from small boats near Basrah and Umm Qasr, pirates 
robbed ships which were usually anchored at oil terminals.  The brand of piracy 




                                            
55 Karsten von Hoesslin, (announcement for discussion meeting, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 23 February 2006). 
56 “Cruise Ship Repels Somali Pirates,” BBC News, 5 November 2005. 
57 “Somali Pirates Detained by US Navy,” ICC Commercial Crime Services News, 24 
January 2006. 
58 Incident occurred on 18 March 2006. Weekly Worldwide Threat to Shipping Report: 
Mariner Warning Information, Office of Naval Intelligence, 5 April 2006. 
59 “Iraq Declared New Piracy Hotspot.” 
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D. MARITIME TERRORISM 
Maritime terrorism has taken many different forms over the years but for 
the most part remained the business of the states involved.60  Similar to the 
debate on piracy, the legal definition of terrorism has not been resolved on the 
international level.  For the most part, Southeast Asian states have avoided the 
struggle to define terrorism by defaulting to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations’ (ASEAN) dictum that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic 
laws of each ASEAN Member Country” be respected in the fight against 
terrorism.  No special counter-terrorism contingencies or arrangements have 
been made between the ASEAN states.61  The accomplishment of both piracy 
and terror by the same group is an issue which adds further complication.  When 
reviewing actual operations, the line between piracy and maritime terrorism 
becomes even more blurred because tactics frequently overlap. 
One maritime event that clearly falls in the terrorism category is the 
Palestinian Liberation Front’s hijacking of the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean 
Sea in 1985.  Notwithstanding the widespread publicity of the Achille Lauro 
episode, over the past thirty years maritime terrorism has constituted only two 
percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide.62  There are good reasons for the 
paucity of maritime terrorist attacks.  Firstly, the number of targets at sea is far 
less than compared to on land.  There are thousands of ports and hundreds of 
thousands of vessels, but unlike a pirate who is seeking financial gain, a 
terrorist’s target must make a political statement or instill fear.  Simply blowing up 




                                            
60 Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment” (2005): 5-9. 
61 Graham Ong, “‘Ships Can be Dangerous Too’: Coupling Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Working 
Paper: International Politics and Security Issues, no. 1 (2004): 12. 
62 Catherine Raymond, “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism in the Malacca Straits,” Terrorism 
Monitor IV, no. 3 (February 2006); James Pelkofski, “Before the Storm: Al Qaeda’s Coming 
Maritime Campaign,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2005, 21-22. 
24 
Even the 2002 attack on the MV Limburg, which was spectacular in terms of 
merchant shipping terms, was not featured in international news headlines for 
more than a day.63 
Secondly, the uncharted and unforgiving nature of maritime operations, 
when compared with the informality of land based operations, presents a 
complicated challenge for terrorists.  Operational maritime plans account for 
weather, sea state, visibility, tides, currents, etc., in addition to observing nautical 
“rules of the road” and physically launching, operating, and recovering a vessel.  
One must either develop through experience or acquire through training the skills 
necessary to operate in the maritime environment.64  Lastly, even with a tool box 
of requisite skills, maritime operations require particular resources and logistics.  
Transporting and storing equipment, such as explosives, weapons, and 
provisions, becomes an order of magnitude more difficult when a land-sea 
transition is involved. 
However, there are also sound reasons why the threat of maritime terror 
should not be dismissed.  Certain types of attacks may be able to bypass many 
of the constraints and complexities listed above.  For example, Superferry 14 
was bombed and sunk off Corregidor Island, Philippines, in February 2004 by 
ASG.  The terrorists required absolutely no special maritime skills to carry a TNT-
packed television set onboard.65  The attacks on the USS Cole and MV Limburg 
demonstrated that Al Qaeda terrorists had been trained in basic levels of 
maritime operations.  Ten months prior to the USS Cole attack, the prototype 
mission failed when the overloaded suicide boat sank upon launching.66  The 
failed attack on the USS The Sullivans demonstrated that even basic maritime 
tactics can not be taken for granted; the successful follow-on attacks in the Gulf 
of Aden demonstrated that the enemy had learned from experience.  
                                            
63 Captain P. Mukundan is director of the IMB  P. Mukundan, “Piracy Threat Dictates Need 
for Intelligence-led Solution,” Jane’s Navy International, 1 November 2004. 
64 Pelkofski, 21-22. 
65 Juliet Labog-Jevellana, “SuperFerry 14 Bombing Solved, says Arroyo,” Inquirer News 
Service, 12 October 2004. 
66 Pelkofski, 21-23. 
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E. MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
From 2000 to 2002 a series of events opened the eyes of Southeast Asia 
to the age of terror.  The first was the February 200 bombing of the Philippine 
ferry, Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed approximately 40 people.   The bombing, 
attributed to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was seen by many as 
another statistic in the longtime separatist struggle of the southern Philippines.  
But Al Qaeda’s attack on the hardened, fully armed USS Cole, a rash of violent 
kidnappings by ASG of Western tourists, and 9/11 clearly demonstrated that 
terrorists were transforming the battlefield.  In December of 2001, the Indonesian 
ferry Kalifornia was bombed.  That incident, along with a foiled plot against U.S. 
ships in Singapore left little doubt that maritime terror was real.  The first Bali 
bombing in 2002 removed any uncertainty that public targets, especially Western 
connected targets, were fair game for terrorists in Southeast Asia.67   
1. Threat Assessment 
The aerial attacks of 9/11 opened many eyes to the fact that terrorist 
groups like Al Qaeda exercised great ingenuity and possessed substantial 
resources.  Some experts theorized that aviation security measures imposed 
after 9/11 would drive the Al Qaeda to the maritime regime.  This fear seemed to 
pan out in June of 2002 when three Al Qaeda operatives were arrested in 
Morocco for plotting to attack U.S. and British ships in the Straits of Gibraltar.  
Others labeled the Sri Lankan separatist group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which has been utilizing maritime terror since the 1980’s, as 
exemplars.68  Additionally, experts feared that terrorists would most likely use the 
shipping industry to smuggle WMD’s since maritime terminal security standards 
varied greatly around the globe and many were considered lax compared to 
airline security standards.69    
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The threat of maritime terrorism was specifically suspected to become 
more significant in Southeast Asia because the environs that gave rise to piracy 
could also foster terrorism.  Economic hardship and inequality not only contribute 
to crime, but may also trigger and feed radical political movements which result in 
terrorism.  Crime, piracy and terrorism function best when state controls are 
weak and law enforcement is corruption prone.  Additionally, terrorists and 
pirates are transnational criminals.  The lax border controls of Southeast Asian 
states coupled with ample hiding places afford both pirates and terrorists alike 
the secrecy required for planning and operating.70 
The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association added the 
Malacca Straits to the “war-risk” zone in June 2005, much to the disappointment 
of regional states.  Regional officials cite that there have been no terrorist attacks 
and the number of actual pirate attacks represents a very small percentage of the 
total traffic through the straits, and in most cases involves small vessels.  Despite 
rebuttals from Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, the JWC maintains that the 
terrorist and piracy threat is significant, based on its risk assessment.71 
2. Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Attacks 
Analogous to pirate tactics, the narrow and congested waterways of 
Southeast Asia’s choke points limit speed and maneuverability, making a vessel 
more susceptible to terrorist attack.   Terrorists looking to hijack a tanker could 
wait under cover of uninhabited isle or the jungles which border many of the 
shipping lanes.  Terrorists could also board a commercial vessel under guise of 
legitimate crewmembers.  Crewmember authentication is virtually impossible, 
especially in ethnically diverse regions such as Southeast Asia.  Thousands of 
cases of falsified or forged certificates have been reported to the IMB in the 
Philippines and Indonesia.  Along the same vein, false papers are often used for 
phantom ship drivers and contraband or stolen cargo as well.  Many legitimately 
owned vessels operating in Southeast Asia fly flags of convenience.  Flags of 
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convenience make it difficult for officials to correlate registrations with owners, 
adding another layer of confusion which could be exploited by terrorists.  
Additionally, ships have become more vulnerable to hijacking and attack because 
the number of crewmembers needed to operate them has been reduced.  
Skeleton crews have become an industry norm as men are replaced by 
technology.72 
Ports are vulnerable by nature because they are accessible from water 
and land.  It is much more difficult to control access to ports than airport terminals 
because of the variety of business occurring.  Ports are often located adjacent to 
large metropolitan areas, and usually have storage facilities for hazardous and 
flammable materials.  A terrorist attack aimed at a port could serve multiple 
purposes.  A major event could harm economic and material interests, it could 
instill great “terror” in the population, and it could represent a symbolic victory if 
perpetrated against a pier-side Western warship, cruise liner, or popular port.73   
Another vulnerable component of the maritime infrastructure is the cargo 
and container process.  Due to the large quantity of cargo and the “just-in-time” 
nature of the delivery system, inspection rates are very low, somewhere in the 
neighborhood of one to five percent depending on the shipper and destination 
country.  Cargo handlers and port officials rarely see the contents of containers 
because most procedures rely on shipping declarations and tamper proof seals 
for determination of security.  There are many opportunities in the life-cycle of a 
shipped container during which the contents may be compromised.  Terrorists 
could place a bomb in a container, or hide themselves inside.74 
The paucity of maritime terrorist incidents makes it hard to determine the 
potential threat and vulnerability to attack.  Terrorists have demonstrated 
ingenuity and sophistication.  Al Qaeda’s trained operatives accomplished the 
9/11 attacks and two maritime attacks in the Middle East.  Southeast Asia’s 
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maritime network possesses traits which may attract terrorists.  Besides piracy, 
Southeast Asia also has a history of terrorism and political violence.   The two 
ingredients - advantageous maritime features and experienced insurrectionists - 
may not complete the recipe but the mixture does generate genuine cause for 
concern over the threat of maritime terrorism, a threat that should not be 
summarily dismissed. 
3. Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia’s infamous history of piracy has been documented above.  
Also recognized is the history of terrorism in the region.  Three of Southeast 
Asia’s most notorious groups are the aforementioned JI and ASG, and Sumatra’s 
Free Aceh Movement (also known as GAM for Gerakan Aceh Merdeka).  JI 
operates in several Southeast Asian countries, seeking to establish a pan-Islamic 
state across the region.  The group turned to violent tactics in the late 1990’s.  
ASG was organized in the early 1990’s as an underground militant group to 
promote Muslim resurgence in the Philippines.  GAM rebels have been fighting 
since 1976 but their targets have normally been separatist-related, such as 
Indonesian authorities. 
JI conducted four noteworthy attacks in Indonesia between 2002 and 
2005, including two large-scale bombings in Bali and car-bomb attacks on the 
Australian Embassy and the J. W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta.  These events, along 
with foiled plans to bomb U.S. commercial airliners and U.S., British, and Israeli 
embassies in Singapore, have demonstrated JI’s predilection towards 
sensational attacks.75  JI’s ties to Al Qaeda and to the ASG are of concern 
because both of those groups have demonstrated proficiency in the maritime 
arena.  More concrete evidence of JI’s intent to commit maritime terror was 
uncovered by Singaporean authorities who uncovered a JI plot to bomb U.S. 
warships at Changi Naval Base and attack commercial ships in the Malacca 
Straits.76    
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The Philippines-based ASG has its roots in maritime terror.  Since ASG is 
primarily concerned with creating a separate Islamic state in the Philippines, its 
operations have been predominantly confined to that vicinity.  One of ASG’s first 
missions was the 1991 bombing of a foreign missionary motor vessel, Doulos, 
which killed two people.  ASG utilizes a wide variety of tactics ranging from 
guerrilla warfare to kidnapping, but many members belong to Muslim families 
with a strong heritage of seafaring.  ASG’s most sensational maritime attack, the 
bombing of Superferry 14 carrying 899 passengers, killed approximately 100 
people.  ASG has also persisted in the conduct of maritime related kidnappings, 
both at sea and at beach resorts.77  
The GAM has conducted seaborne operations on the Malacca Straits.  In 
2001, the GAM went so far as to issue a warning that all ships transiting between 
Sumatra and Malaysia must first receive their permission.78  In the past, the GAM 
has been accused of committing at-sea robberies and kidnaps-for-ransom in 
order to raise money for their insurgency.  Others suspected that crime 
syndicates pretending to be GAM rebels perpetrated many of the kidnappings.79  
Currently, the GAM is under a peace agreement which went into force in August 
2005. 
As counter-terrorism measures are established, groups may change their 
modus operandi.  In Indonesia, five women have been arrested since October 
2005, for smuggling bomb-making hardware and volatile chemicals into the 
country.  Prior to that date, all detainees for smuggling explosive substances had 
been men.  The change in tactics indicates that Southeast Asian terrorist groups 
are trying to adapt to Indonesia’s expansion of counter-terrorism security policies 
since the Bali attacks.80  Hardening of land-based targets and step-up of port 
security since 9/11 may lead terrorists to target at-sea ships, including suicide 
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attacks similar to the USS Cole, hijack ships for use as a subsequent floating 
bomb, and commit kidnap-for-ransom.81  One should expect terrorist groups to 
continue moving away from traditional tactics as law enforcement and counter-
terrorism pressures increase. 
When considering the prevalence of terrorism in Southeast Asia, and the 
aforementioned vulnerabilities of the Malacca Straits and its 50,000 transiting 
vessels per year, the possibility of a major maritime terrorist attack seems real.82  
Two active Southeast Asian terrorist groups, ASG and JI, have participated or 
shown interest in maritime terror.  Both groups have suspected links to Al Qaeda.  
In light of the piracy trend toward more violence and recent terrorist partiality to 
sensational targets, a number of frightening scenarios come to mind when 
combining the maritime domain, pirate tactics, and terrorist objectives.  
4. Maritime Terror Scenarios in Southeast Asia 
While cause for concern may be collective, there is no consensus among 
experts as to the probability or feasibility of different maritime terrorist attacks.  
Scholars and media have suggested a number of maritime terror scenarios.  A 
discussion of these scenarios will be constructive in comprehending the scope 
and complexity of different types of attacks, and vital to understanding the 
challenges involved with preventing attacks.  The below terrorism scenarios are 
presented with accompanying discussion of feasibility.  Though described as 
potential events in Southeast Asia, each may be considered as a universal 
maritime terrorist tactic:83 
1) Ship as a barrier: One of the more suggested attacks involves sinking a 
large vessel in the Malacca Straits, thus blocking all traffic.  Initially, an attack of 
this nature may cause a major traffic jam but even at its narrowest point, the 
Malacca Straits are nearly two miles wide.84  If a ship could be sunk exactly at 
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the narrowest point, which in itself would require a meticulous plan, traffic would 
still be able to pass albeit at an even more cautious speed than usual.  If a 
number of ships were sunk, the straits could conceivably be blocked. 
2) Ship as a weapon: One of the more terrifying scenarios involves the 
detonation of a high-risk load such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Singapore 
harbor.  The “floating bomb” scenario could shut down Singapore’s piers and 
impact the world economy.  Pirates have hijacked large tankers in the past, but 
the capacity to detonate a tanker’s payload has not been demonstrated.85  LNG, 
which is probably the most potentially dangerous cargo, could be ignited and 
cause catastrophic fire damage.  LNG terminals are also lucrative terrorist targets 
because the potential for fire damage is even greater.86   
The ship as a weapon scenario presents a number of complexities.  
Terrorists would have to use an adequate explosive device to ensure ignition of 
the LNG, rather than relying on collision to start a blaze.  The sequence of events 
would have to be timed correctly.  If crude oil tankers were used as the weapon, 
the fire and resulting damage would be more localized.  Chemical tankers as 
weapons could pose a toxicity risk, as well as an explosive risk.  Terrorists would 
have to have a functional knowledge of the ship’s safety features and a well 
thought out plan in order to effect a catastrophic explosion or leak at the right 
time and location; a disjointed attack would not guarantee a fireball.  Another 
obstacle for terrorists is that a large vessel may be impeded from a direct hit on a 
populated target by shoals or narrow channels.  Long-term damage resulting 
from an explosion on-board a tanker would depend on the type of vessel 
involved, amount and type of cargo on board, and possibly the prevailing winds 
and tides.87   
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The 2002 arrest of Al Qaeda commander, al-Nashiri, has convinced some 
analysts that a ship-as-weapon attack is plausible.  Al-Nashiri masterminded Al 
Qaeda’s small-boat attacks in Yemen.  During interrogation after his arrest, al-
Nashiri reportedly told officials that Al Qaeda had an instruction manual which 
described the best places to hit vessels (with explosive-laden small boats).  The 
manual also detailed how to employ limpet mines, fire RPG’s from high-speed 
boats, turn LNG tankers into floating bombs, and other very technical maritime 
operations.88     
3) Mining: Though rarely discussed, mining would be an effective strategy 
for terrorists to close the Malacca Straits.  Media and political attention would be 
high, even if the claim of mines is made without incident.  However, the damage 
caused by a mine would depend on the type of mine and type of ship engaged, 
the latter being out of the control of the terrorists.  Additionally, mining requires 
sophisticated employment and weaponeering plans.  Though economic impacts 
may be substantial, loss of life and physical damage may not be.    
4) Ship as a Weapon’s Platform: Using a ship as a platform from which to 
launch a shoulder fired surface-to-air missile (SAM) is a viable tactic.  SAM’s are 
available on the black market and aircraft arriving at Singapore International must 
approach or depart over the shipping lanes.  However, there is nothing about this 
type of scenario which is unique to the maritime arena.  If terrorists were planning 
to launch a missile at a large aircraft, a launch site could be chosen near any 
international airport and would not necessarily be at-sea.  Terrorists would most 
likely choose the site which allowed for the easiest escape - a small vessel in 
Singapore is just one option. 
5) Small boat attack: An attack in which a small, explosive-laden boat 
rams into the hull of a larger vessel can be extremely lethal, especially in the 
congested harbors of Southeast Asia.  This type attack was successfully  
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employed off of Yemen by Al Qaeda, on the USS Cole and MV Limburg.  An 
attractive feature of the small boat attack, from a terrorist perspective, is the 
relatively low amount of training and coordination required. 
6) Smuggling of WMD:  Terrorists may use the shipping industry as a 
vehicle for smuggling a radioactive or chemical/biological weapon into a target for 
detonation in a major seaport, or for further transfer.  The maritime shipping 
industry seems the most likely transport vehicle for international transport of 
WMD’s (excepting common land-border traffic) because of inconsistent 
inspection standards.  Also, ninety-five percent of the world’s international cargo 
travels via ship.89   
F. CONCLUSION 
Piracy has evolved from the Golden Age into a modern day phenomenon 
that is often violent and sometimes deadly.  Piracy trends in Southeast Asia and 
instances of piracy around the globe indicate that today’s professional pirates are 
well-organized and well-equipped, wielding modern arms and high-technology 
communications, surveillance, and navigation equipment.  Southeast Asian pirate 
gangs have no compunction about taking hostages and some have resorted to 
kidnap-for-ransom tactics.  Though total the number of reported piracy attacks 
dropped in 2005, the gravity of the situation is heavier than ever due to the brand 
of violence. 
Maritime terrorist events, the type that would garner world-wide media 
attention, may prove more complex than land attacks.  The fact that a Southeast 
Asian terrorist group such as JI would require special resources and training in 
order to accomplish a large-scale maritime terror attack has led some to question 
the threat.  Others see the history of Southeast Asia’s terrorist groups, including 
acts of piracy and at-sea terror, as a precursor to more spectacular maritime 
events.  ASG has conducted a number of maritime terrorist acts, and GAM has  
 
 
                                            
89 B Raman, “Comprehensive Maritime Security,” South Asia Analysis Group Paper, no. 
1403 (4 June 2005); Carafano, “Making the Sea Safer,” 15.  
34 
been suspected of using kidnap-for-ransom tactics in a limited number of cases, 
but there is still little evidence that terrorist groups are colluding with economic 
pirates.90   
Therefore, the probability of another maritime terrorist event is coupled to 
the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, not to the pirate threat.  Maritime terrorist 
events are plausible as demonstrated by ASG, but the prevalence of piracy in the 
region does not increase the probability of terrorist attack.  In fact, the maritime 
security issues which were important to Southeast Asian states prior to the 
spotlight being shone on terrorism by the GWOT are still the most germane.   
The primary issue is the level of governmental commitment and concern for the 
general security of choke points and ports.  In collective territories, such as the 
Malacca Straits, formulation of cooperative polices will likely be needed to ensure 
the safety of commerce.  In major shipping ports, Southeast Asian nations should 
understand and address the concerns of international users.   
The security dilemma for anti-piracy and counter-terrorism policy is not a 
mutually exclusive problem.  As discussed above, for a number of scenarios 
there are known commonalities between both maritime threats, such as vessel 
hijacking.  Southeast Asian nations can endeavor to gain synergistic effects by 
developing and applying maritime security policy which covers both pirate and 
terrorist tactics.  Likewise, the reduction of maritime vulnerabilities may also 
benefit security in both the criminal and terrorist arena.  As will be discussed 
further in Chapter III, patrolling congested traffic patterns and monitoring coastal 
environments are examples of two functions that Southeast Asian maritime 
forces had undertaken to prevent piracy.  These and other measures are patently 
appropriate for preventing all types of unlawful maritime activity.   
The threat of terrorism, including maritime terrorism, is difficult to assess 
because so much about the threat is unknown and unpredictable.  So, efforts 
must continue on the state, regional, and international level to define terrorist 
organizations.  When terrorist links are uncovered, like those between JI and Al 
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Qaeda, it will be best for nations to share information with other concerned 
parties so that the terrorist’s objectives may be thoroughly investigated.  The 
transnational character of terrorism compels an international security strategy.  It 
is important for Southeast Asian states to promote policies which allow active 
participation in regional and international security establishment.   
There is also much that is not yet understood with regard to piracy in 
Southeast Asia.  Regional governments and concerned actors should look to 
inform maritime security policy by researching the links between piracy and other 
illegal activities such as smuggling, poaching, black marketeering, and human, 
narcotics, and arms trafficking.  The role of corruption and collusion between 
pirates and law state officials should be clarified.  In a region which is limited in 
maritime security resources, it would be prudent to evaluate the economic 
impacts of piracy versus the costs of security responses before deciding on 
policy.  And though a conspiracy between terrorists and pirates has not been 
uncovered, the relationship between the two may change as a result of security 
posture or other forces.  Therefore, it is important for Southeast Asian states to 
consider and explore the effects that security policies may have on the piracy-
terrorism relationship.91 
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III. MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The 9/11 attacks not only changed the way that Americans viewed the 
threat of terrorism, but also illustrated to the world that the potential target set for 
terrorists had widely expanded.  The lethality generated by a common means of 
transportation (and potentially by WMD’s) demonstrated a major shortfall in the 
international security realm.  In the aftermath of 9/11, maritime infrastructure 
emerged as a likely candidate for terrorist attack.  Southeast Asia, home to 
globally important sea lines of communication (SLOC), strategic choke points 
and a vast maritime network of ports, also emerged as a likely candidate for 
terrorist attacks, primarily for the reasons discussed in the Chapter II regarding 
the threat of terrorism.  
Also discussed in the Chapter II was the rise of modern day piracy in 
Southeast Asia.  Piracy tactics have turned increasingly more violent, and pirates 
have become more organized.  Experts differ in opinion on whether or not piracy 
trends will result in an increase of maritime terrorism.  Certainly there is nothing 
prohibiting terrorists from using piracy tactics or collaborating with pirates to 
conduct maritime terror.  But even if similar tactics are used, the distinction 
between the goals of pirates and terrorists is clear.  Pirates seek economic gains; 
terrorists seek political objectives.  A terrorist group committing piracy for 
financial gain is conducting crime at-sea, not maritime terrorism.  However, 
because piracy and the threat of maritime terrorism coexist in Southeast Asia, it 
may be possible to direct maritime security policies towards the prevention of 
both events.  
Chapter III will study unilateral, regional, and international maritime 
security policies in Southeast Asia.  Regional policies connected to major 
international actors, such as the United States, will be evaluated separately.  The 
objective of this chapter is to examine Southeast Asia’s maritime security policies 
in the face of piracy and the potentiality of maritime terror, and identify any issues 
that are applicable to U.S. maritime security strategy.  
38 
A. IMPORTANCE OF SECURING SOUTHEAST ASIA’S WATERS 
Southeast Asia’s waters are strategically important to regional and 
international economies.  Approximately one-third of the world’s shipping, half of 
the world’s oil, and a quarter of the world’s cargo passes through the region.92  
Commercial traffic through the Malacca Straits continues to grow.  Nearly two-
hundred commercial vessels per day pass through the Malacca Straits, including 
tankers carrying eighty percent of northeast Asia’s oil. 
The issue of importance pertains to far more than just the matter of 
keeping the sea-lanes open.  Of equal or greater importance to the world 
economy are Southeast Asia’s ports, especially Singapore.93  In a 1993 study by 
the Center for Naval Analysis, the economic costs of blocked trade were 
predicted to be much larger in magnitude than detour costs.  It was estimated 
that a diverting of ships around the Malacca Straits would cost the world 
economy $3.5 to $8 billion.  The study estimated that the port blockage cost for 
Singapore would be $130 billion.  If all major Southeast Asian ports were closed, 
the cost to the global economy was estimated to be over $230 billion.94 
Southeast Asia’s waters will continue to gain importance.  Within the next 
ten years, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of China, India, and 
Japan is forecasted to surpass that of the United States.  By the halfway point of 
this century, China’s GDP is forecasted to be the world’s largest and the 
combined GDP of China, India and Japan to be twice that of the United States.95  
The expected growth of Asia will place the waters of Southeast Asia at the 
world’s economic center of gravity, making maritime security an even higher 
priority.   
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B. UNILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY  
1. Indonesia 
Indonesian officials are aware that the marked increase in piracy of the 
2000’s has largely occurred in their waters. But the economic doldrums that 
contributed to the rise in piracy also impaired Indonesia from combating the 
crimes.  As an example, in 1999 Singapore spent $4.2 billion on its military, 
Indonesia spent only $1.5 billion.  Controlling the vast archipelagic waters and 
territorial seas of Indonesia would be a formidable task for a 300-ship Navy; 
Indonesia has approximately 115 ships dedicated to maritime protection of which 
about one-quarter are operating at any one time.  Additionally, coordination of 
efforts between the different governmental, private, and military agencies 
responsible for maritime security has been disjointed.96  Indonesia has at least 
ten agencies that have some involvement in maritime security management with 
nine authorized to conduct law enforcement operations at sea.  Reform efforts 
are ongoing.97 
Indonesia is modernizing its Navy with focus on coastal interdiction and 
patrol.  Indonesia has established Navy Command Control Centers in Batam and 
Belawan which include assets and special forces designed to rapidly respond to 
hijackings and “hit and run” piracy.98  The Indonesian Navy is installing radar and 
communications towers at nine locations along the Malacca Straits.  The system 
will facilitate tracking and reporting of pirate activity.99   
With regard to territorial jurisdiction, Indonesia has been one of the most 
vocal Southeast Asian states advocating the protection of sovereignty.  
Indonesia’s suspicious nature is demonstrated by their unwillingness to 
cooperate in multilateral or extra-regional initiatives such as those suggested by 
Japan (see below).  Indonesian policy makers feel that cooperating with Japan 
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comes at a high cost internationally and domestically.  Due to domestic 
problems, piracy is a lower priority for Indonesia than for other states like 
Singapore.  Some even suspect that fighting piracy is a low priority because 
certain political elements may be profiting from the criminal activity.100  
The news is not all grim as some positive turnarounds have been made by 
Indonesia in the Malacca Straits.  In 2005, Indonesia’s Operation Gurita resulted 
in numerous gangs of pirates being caught and at least six small vessels being 
recovered.  Indonesia’s positive efforts helped decrease attacks in Indonesia 
from 94 in 2004, to 79 in 2005.  Attacks in the Malacca Straits fell from 38 in 
2004, to 12 in 2005.101    
2. Malaysia 
Like Indonesia’s maritime forces, the Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN) has a 
daunting task because of its divided geography stretching 1,500 miles from the 
northern end of the Malacca Straits to the southern Philippines border.  Further 
demands are placed on the navy by distant claims to contested islands and 
protection of offshore assets.  One must not forget that the securing the Malacca 
Straits is just one of Malaysia’s many maritime priorities.102   
Malaysia also has fears of terrorism, especially from JI or JI splinter 
groups.  Maritime security has been bolstered over the past few years to protect 
ships and important channels in East Malaysia.  The RMN has offered escort 
services to high-risk commercial vessels entering from the Philippine waters.  In 
the West, Malaysia has employed a string of radar tracking stations along the 
Malacca Straits to monitor traffic.  The RMN and Royal Malaysian Marine Police 
(RMMP) have acquired new patrol boats and increased response capacity.103   
Malaysia’s recent formation of a new coast guard, the Malaysian Maritime 
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Enforcement Agency (MMEA), is designed to relieve pressure on the RMN and 
RMMP, and better align assets with missions.  Malaysia hopes that the MMEA 
will consolidate the maritime security effort which was previously managed by 
eleven governmental departments and involved more than 400 boats.  Malaysia 
plans to have all 72 MMEA vessels in service by July 2006.104 
Malaysia is also streamlining the Maritime Enforcement Coordination 
Center (MECC) by authorizing the MECC to coordinate all enforcement activities 
of the RMN, Air Force, Marine Police, Fisheries Department, and Royal Customs 
and Excise Department.  The MECC coordination effort will soon benefit from the 
use of new satellite monitoring and communications technology.105 
3. Singapore 
For more than any other Southeast Asian nation, 9/11 was a wake up call 
for Singapore.  Leaders immediately realized how vulnerable Singapore was to 
terror, especially its ports.  Singapore’s military began counter-terrorism training 
and the government launched an awareness campaign for the populace.106  
Singapore’s concern for the threat of terror is revealed by the title of the 2004 
document, “The Fight Against Terror, Singapore’s National Security Strategy.” 
Singapore’s “total defense” campaign at home has spilled over to the 
diplomatic realm.  Singapore has not been shy about urging ASEAN to move 
past discussing the maritime threat and taking action.  In May 2005, Singapore’s 
Defense Minister suggested that ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
should host maritime security exercises.107  Singapore’s Defense Minister has 
also claimed that the responsibility for security belongs to any nation that transits 
the Malacca Straits. This is of no surprise as Singapore’s economy is tied to its 
ports, which accommodate over 1,000 ships per day. 
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Singapore has led the charge in attempting to couple piracy and terrorism 
under one campaign.  By conflating the two, Singapore hopes to influence 
regional neighbors to increase security efforts and perhaps pave the road for 
multilateral efforts or a UN-sponsored task force.  Linking the two threats may 
also make it more palatable for governments and their constituents to accept 
outside assistance and allow interested foreign naval powers such as the United 
States, India, and Japan, to patrol their waters.  Singapore has been joined in its 
campaigning by various non-state affiliated agencies like the IMB and ship owner 
associations.108 
Singapore is the technological trend setter in Southeast Asia.  Singapore 
has integrated a surveillance and information network for tracking and 
investigating suspicious activity, and requires that even small boats be fitted with 
tracking devices.109  Singapore has increased navy and coast guard patrols and 
instituted random escort of high-value merchant vessels through the Singapore 
Straits.110  Singapore’s Navy is acquiring a number of blue-water capable 
frigates.   
Singapore has also imposed security procedures on visiting ships.  
Immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Singapore ordered numerous 
restrictions on vessels entering port.  Pleasure craft have been banned from 
entering or exiting the port at night or transiting important shipping lanes at night.  
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4. Philippines 
The Philippines has not placed the prevention of piracy among its top 
national agendas.112  The Philippine Navy is the weakest in Southeast Asia and 
would be severely tested in sustaining any type of counter-terrorism patrols, 
especially given the expansive territory which the navy must cover.113  In an 
effort to expand their posture, the Philippine Navy activated a detachment to 
support counter-terrorism efforts east of Mindanao in November 2005.  The 
detachment’s mission was to increase patrol presence in major sea routes and 
assist with ship surveillance in the area, currently being performed by land 
radar.114  The Philippines is also seeking assistance and training to improve the 
quality of its navy.  U.S.-Philippine bilateral maritime training exercises will be 
discussed below. 
As a close ally of the United States, the Philippines benefits greatly from 
U.S. assistance in its fight against secessionist terrorism.  Most of the Philippine 
counter-terrorism efforts are aimed against the ASG.  Though much of the ASG’s 
capabilities have been diminished by Filipino forces in the past few years, 
officials are aware that the ASG’s may still possess the desire and capacity to 
strike the maritime sector, day or night.  Experts state that to counter ASG’s 
maritime operations, the Philippines must redress a weak intelligence network.  
Despite efforts to strengthen the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, 
military authorities cite non-sharing of intelligence as hampering the anti-
terrorism campaign.115 
5. Thailand 
Thailand has become a cooperative partner in the war on terrorism since 
2003.   Thailand’s major security concerns are internally, Muslim separatism in 
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the southern most provinces, and externally, narcotics from Myanmar.  With 
regard to maritime security, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has established a Coast 
Guard Command.  The 68,000 man Thai navy is somewhat limited in capability 
but Thailand has a relatively small responsibility since there are few maritime 
zones under its jurisdiction.116 
C. COOPERATIVE MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES 
[I]ndividual state action is not enough.  The oceans are indivisible 
and maritime security threats do not respect the boundaries.117  
Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tony Tan 
1. Bilateral and Trilateral Policy 
Bilaterally, Singapore and Indonesia responded to the surge in modern-
day piracy with a 1992 agreement for coordinating patrols, which helped stem 
problems in the Singapore Straits until the Asian financial crisis. Likewise, 
Indonesia and Malaysia began coordinating efforts the same year to protect the 
Malacca Straits.  Singapore and Malaysia and the Philippines and Malaysia later 
established similar coordination plans for protecting the Malacca Straits and 
curbing cross-border illegal activities, respectively.   The RMN and RTN have 
also patrolled jointly.  These bilateral endeavors have been inconsistent in 
application and effectiveness.  Some attribute the decrease of piracy in the 
Malacca Straits (44 in 2001 to 21 in 2003 to 12 in 2005) to the cooperative 
efforts.  Others question whether the patrols are more symbolic than effective, as 
the Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol occurred only four times per year.118   
Twice a year, Indonesia’s navy conducts joint patrols with India’s navy to 
protect the Six Degree Channel, the waterway to the west of the Malacca Straits.  
Indonesia prepared 40 ships for the exercise in September 2005.  In addition to 
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anti-piracy, the two navies stress the prevention of smuggling, illegal fishing, 
human and drug trafficking, arms running, and maritime terrorism. The 
overarching objective of the coordinated patrols is to enhance mutual 
understanding and interoperability between the two navies.119 
India is also using naval diplomacy to broaden relationships with Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  High level port visits, joint working 
groups, officer exchange programs, mutual attendance at symposiums, and 
bilateral exercises are examples of the efforts India has made over the past few 
years.  In addition to protecting the economic sea lanes, India has a material 
interest in securing the western seas of Southeast Asia.  By 2012 an undersea 
pipeline will carry natural gas from Myanmar to India.120  
In May of 2005 Project SURPIC (surface picture), an initiative to improve 
cooperation and information sharing, was launched between the Indonesian and 
Singaporean navies.121  In the southeast end of the region, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia signed a tripartite anti-terrorist pact in 2002.   The 
“Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communications 
Procedures” builds the framework for cooperation and interoperability.  So far, 
there has been little confirmable success attributed to the cooperative.122   
More recently in November 2005, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
began discussions to establish a line of defense against pirates and terrorists 
along their common sea borders.  Dubbed Coast Watch South (CWS) by the 
Philippines, the effort was aimed at restricting the movement of JI militants in the 
Celebes and Sulawesi Seas.  According to the Filipino Defense Secretary, the 
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National Defense Department has made CWS a priority for 2006.  The navy-led 
CWS intends to employ assets from the Philippine navy, coast guard, maritime 
police and Bureaus of Immigration and Customs.  Neither interagency nor 
interstate details have been flushed out.123  
2. Multilateral Policy 
It would be very nice if [multinational cooperation] could happen, 
but the issue of sovereignty in [Southeast Asian countries is] such 
that it won’t happen soon …It’s a very, very sensitive issue.124  Mr. 
Mukundan, IMB Director 
Transnational crimes - piracy, narcotics and human trafficking, arms 
running, money laundering, black marketing, illegal immigration - and terrorism 
are a challenge to the governments of Southeast Asia because the acts defy 
domestic jurisdictions.  Southeast Asian governments are coming to the 
realization, sometimes grudgingly, that the only way to combat the transnational 
activities is via cooperation.  Considering the scope of the problems, cooperation 
has been limited as most states prefer to act, and react, on a national level.125  
But two factors point to a promising trend.  First, as the economies of Southeast 
Asia recover from the Asian financial crisis, the states are becoming more 
economically interdependent with each other and with international trading 
partners.  As budgets enlarge, governments will be able to spend more on 
security.  Second, the threat of transnational terrorism has been thrust upon 
Southeast Asia.  Political violence is nothing new to the region, and many of 
Southeast Asia’s rebel groups had international ties long before 9/11.  But highly 
visible attacks like the Bali bombings and Superferry 14 have sounded a clear 
alarm that Southeast Asia will play an important part in the GWOT.   
The first step in the regional cooperative effort to eradicate piracy was the 
IMB’s establishment of the PRC in 1992.  Since then, there have been many 
developments as will be discussed below.  The wave of global terror has spurred 
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more cooperative efforts in the past five years.  The bilateral efforts tended to 
produce more operational cooperation, whereas multilateral endeavors have in 
large part concentrated on information sharing and dialogue.  A measured 
amount of operational cooperation has been achieved in the Malacca Straits, but 
overall, multilateral maritime security efforts remain thin.  The small number of 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements created may be insufficient to provide a 
long-term solution to the increase in at-sea violence and threat of maritime 
terror.126   
a. ASEAN 
Forming substantive multilateral efforts has been problematic.  
ASEAN has refrained from pushing a purposeful multilateral approach to piracy, 
respecting the traditional concepts of sovereignty.  ASEAN has also been careful 
not to stretch linkages between terrorism and piracy, smuggling, money-
laundering, or other transnational crimes.  ASEAN has a multitude of adjunct fora 
to address transnational crime.  Most discussion has centered on overcoming 
dissimilarity of laws and sharing of information.127  
The most significant multilateral mechanism for dealing with piracy 
and other regional threats has been the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC).  The AMMTC grew out of fears of terrorism in the 
mid 1990’s and forms the core of ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation.  After 
9/11, the AMMTC updated its terrorist work plan for the region, and advocated a 
number of collaborative initiatives concerning the formation of a terrorist task 
force and extradition of terrorist suspects.128  
In 2002, ASEAN adopted a work program to implement the ASEAN 
Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes.  The plan advocates sharing 
information, cooperating and training in anti-piracy measures, building capacity 
and providing technical assistance for needy states.129  To focus more on 
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terrorism, ASEAN adopted the Vientiane Programme (VAP) in 2004.  VAP 
continues to work toward implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crimes, and also promotes the overarching vision of the ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC).  ASC is a concept proposed and promoted by 
Indonesia to counter crime and terrorism.  The ASC does not provide military 
alliance or new security structures, but rather emphasizes existing instruments 
from the nonaligned Cold War era such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the Southeast Asian 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.  The ASC was proposed in 2003 and followed up 
when the ASC Plan of Action was approved in 2004.130  
The ARF, which follows the “ASEAN way” of emphasizing 
relationship building and dialogue rather than pressuring mutual action, has been 
addressing piracy for years.  Discussion has primarily centered on working 
around the different international interpretations of piracy and sovereignty issues.  
Participation in any measure is voluntary and respect of sovereignty and national 
jurisdictions is paramount.131  But the war on terror has heightened the ARF’s 
attention to security.  In 2003, the ARF issued a “Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy and other Threats to Maritime Security” to improve bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation between members.  The statement aimed to conflate the 
response to piracy and terrorism, mostly by enhancing information sharing.  In 
2004 at the ARF Workshop on Maritime Security, participants agreed that 
collective action was required to combat maritime threats.132  The ARF’s “Work 
Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational  
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Crime” was endorsed by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.133  These statements 
represent a trend toward cooperative norms, a change from the ASEAN norms of 
sovereignty preservation and non-interference.   
b. TRACK II 
Regarding “Track II” or non-governmental ARF efforts, the Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has established a maritime 
security team but the group has taken a broad approach rather than focusing on 
piracy or terrorism.  The CSCAP, via a Memorandum for Cooperation for Law 
and Order at Sea, has advocated “confidence-building” efforts like naval 
cooperation, and proposed a set of guidelines to enhance a broad range of 
information sharing and cooperative efforts.134  
 The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China 
Sea illustrates the cautious and convoluted manner in which regional security 
processes evolve in Southeast Asia.  Throughout the 1990’s, the South China 
Sea workshops (and offshoot workshops) convened a number of times to discuss 
matters of security, safety, legality, technology, communications, search and 
rescue, and environmental protection.  Ten years of meetings produced 
numerous reports and recommendations, but no signed conventions or 
agreements.  This judgment is not meant as an indictment of the process, but 
rather an observation that any effort to strengthen maritime security in Southeast 
Asia must account for significant differences between states, including:135 
1)  Conflicting and ambiguous laws and definitions (including articles 
on the international level). 
2)  Convoluted lines of authority and law enforcement responsibilities. 
3)  Disparity of resources. 
4) Different levels of willingness to cooperate. 
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Track II and official diplomatic dialogues are superb vehicles for identifying 
issues like the four listed above; the challenge is moving past the dialogue stage 
and bringing meaningful, action-oriented commitments to fruition. 
c. Malacca Straits Security Initiative 
In 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia launched a trilateral 
coordinated patrol as part of Operation Malsindo under the Malacca Straits 
Security Initiative (MSSI).  Navies of each country coordinate patrols while 
remaining in their own territorial waters.  The navies have established a 
communications link between command centers at Batam (Indonesia), Lumut 
(Malaysia), and Changi (Singapore), and have also granted merchant vessels 
access to official frequencies so direct calls for assistance could be made.   The 
“hotline” will allow swift communications but the agreement lacks an unabated 
“hot pursuit” clause.  Approximately 80 percent of Southeast Asia’s pirate attacks 
occur within territorial waters.  The right of hot pursuit allows law enforcement to 
pursue an attacker onto the high seas, but not into the sovereign seas of another 
nation.  In the past, pirates have used this legal seam to their advantage, 
deliberately fleeing across jurisdictional lines.136   
Officials from three Malsindo and Thai navies met last August to 
discuss the “hot pursuit” issue.137  The Thai navy was invited to participate in the 
joint patrol in the summer of 2005.  As it stands, patrol boats can not freely enter 
each other’s territory while giving chase.  Navies must rely on communications to 
coordinate a hot hand-off, a tactic which may be less effective than maintaining 
physical contact until hand-off.138   
The MSSI also includes joint air patrols.  In September 2005, “Eyes 
in the Sky” took to the air over the Malacca Straits.  Thailand was invited to 
participate as an observer.  Initial plans called for two sorties per country per 
week, to patrol the straits.  Only one aircraft will patrol at a time, remaining over  
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water, and radioing suspicious contacts to the appropriate patrol assets.  The 
limited detection capability and range of the air patrols, combined with the scant 
number of missions, raises doubt as to the efficacy of Eyes in the Sky.139   
Regardless of potential shortcomings, the MSSI is the first to 
operationalize multilateral cooperation without the participation of a non-regional 
actor.  The media coverage for the patrols, and the fact that India and Thailand 
expressed interest in joining, signify a growing commitment to coordinated 
maritime security in the region.  Whether or not initiatives such MSSI are more 
symbolic than functional is yet to be determined.  But in light of international 
pressure to protect the vital straits, any cooperative operation should be seen as 
a success, or at least a start down the right track.140 
d. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery 
A Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) was reached by sixteen nations (ASEAN members 
plus China, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka) in November 
2004.  ReCAAP, proposed originally by Japan, will maintain databases, conduct 
analysis, and facilitate information sharing to members via an Information 
Sharing Center (ISC) to be built in Singapore.  Proponents point to ReCAAP as a 
positive step for the region because it is a pan-Asian effort to deal with piracy.  
Critics point out that after a long negotiation period, ReCAAP emerged as a non-
binding, externally funded organization which will only collate voluntarily 
submitted information.141  To date, ReCAAP has been signed by eleven of the 
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3. International Initiatives 
a. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts) 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
The IMO sponsored 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was an indirect offshoot 
of the Achille Lauro hijacking.  Ratification gives signatories the right to prosecute 
criminals caught in their own territorial waters for unlawful acts, such as piracy, 
committed in jurisdictions of other signatories.  The convention would be vital for 
combating crimes and other crimes because it would apply to attacks committed 
in ports, territorial waters, or international seas.  The convention makes 
distinction for the motive of the perpetrator, so maritime terrorism and violent 
piracy would both be infractions under the SUA.  
The United States and other maritime powers such as Canada, 
Australia, China, Japan, and European nations have ratified the SUA.  To date in 
Southeast Asia, only Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Brunei 
have ratified the Convention.  Other nations fear that ratification would 
compromise national sovereignty and potentially allow foreign forces to pursue 
pirates, terrorists, and maritime criminals across territorial borders.142  Even if all 
parties concerned ratified the SUA, its definition of offenses may only pertain to 
serious incidents such as vessel hijackings.  Most Southeast Asian nations are 
more concerned about the more common forms of maritime robbery.143    
b. Five Power Defense Arrangement 
The Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a Cold War 
holdover comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Great Brain, Australia, and New 
Zealand met in June 2004 to reorient the organization towards nontraditional 
maritime security and counter-terrorism.  The meeting resulted in an FPDA anti-
terror exercise.144   
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c. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
In 2002, the IMO introduced the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) which outlined detailed security measures for 
worldwide shipping companies, port authorities, and governments.  The ISPS 
Code is one of a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) Convention.145  ISPS Code applies to vessels over 300 GT, 
international port facilities, passenger ships, and mobile offshore drilling units.  
This may be viewed as a shortcoming since fishing boats, tugboats, and 
domestic-only trade vessels are immune.  ISPS has three security levels - 
normal, heightened, and exceptional - which require different measures.  
Singapore finished ISPS implementation ahead of the July 2004 implementation 
deadline.   
Bringing ships and ports up to the ISPS Code means implementing 
a number of security measures such as performing routine checks, assessing 
infrastructure, submitting security plans, assigning security personnel, controlling 
access, monitoring cargo and personnel, ensuring ready communications, and 
installing certain security equipment.  More than 21,000 ships and 6,000 ports 
will be affected by the ISPS Code.  The IMB Director reported that some “highly 
regarded industry figures” have complained that procedural compliance can be a 
burden and distraction from primary duties, such as navigation and cargo care-
taking.  Many states lack the resources to implement full ISPS standards.  Even 
in cases where security plans are in place, officials fear that the implementation 
of ISPS procedures may rest with low ranking, untrained crewmembers and 
therefore devolve into a “box ticking” exercise.146  Enforcement of ISPS Code 
also varies from state to state.  Progress in this area has been slow because 
external assessment is not required.  With self-assessment as the norm,  
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evaluating ship controls is especially problematic.  The ISPS Code continues to 
proliferate fairly rapidly, but until formal evaluations are institutionalized and the 
human element addressed, effectiveness will be difficult to measure.147   
d. Secure Trade in the APEC Region 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) convened its fourth 
“Secure Trade in the APEC Region” (STAR) conference in February 2006.  
APEC, designed as an economic cooperative, has in many ways been more 
action-oriented in the maritime security realm than ASEAN.   STAR aims to 
create and enhance public-private partnerships to promote secure trade 
initiatives in all transportation modes.   
Each APEC participant, including the Southeast Asian states, has 
submitted a STAR plan of action complete with implementation milestones for 
APEC frameworks and other planned measures.  There are numerous initiatives 
in work.  Maritime trade programs include identification of high risk cargo, 
container screening, container protection, supply chain security, port and ship 
security, and cooperation enhancement in fighting piracy.148  APEC programs 
combine elements of ISPS, Container Security Initiative (CSI, described below), 
and other trade security programs.  
e. Sponsored Forums 
The Shangri La Dialogue is just one example of the many dialogue 
conferences held in Southeast Asia.  Started in 2002 by London’s Institute for 
International Strategic Studies, the annual event held in Singapore’s Shangri La 
Hotel is designed as another avenue to promote Asian defense dialogue.  The 
dialogue comprises key governmental officials and Track II participants, and 
covers a broad range of regional and global security issues.  There are 
numerous other security conferences, such as the “Counter-Terrorism Expert’s  
 
 
                                            
147 “Maritime Security Status Conference Report,” (Copenhagen: January 2005). 
148  “STAR Conference Reports,” (Report of Fourth STAR Conference, Hanoi, APEC, 2006). 
<APEC.org> accessed May 2006. 
55 
Conference” held in the Philippines in April 2006.  Other meetings and 
workshops focus more directly on maritime security, such as the IMO sponsored 
maritime security meeting planned for later this year in Malaysia.   
D. FOREIGN STATE EFFORTS 
1. Japan 
In Southeast Asia From Rest of the World Total Attacks 
1989-2002 127 55 
 
Table 4.   Piracy against Japanese Vessels149 
 
As Table 4 depicts, Japan has a vested interest in combating piracy in 
Southeast Asia.  Accordingly, Japan has been the leading international state in 
promoting maritime security in Southeast Asia.  At the 1999 ASEAN summit, 
Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi pitched a multinational coast guard, dubbed the 
“Obuchi Initiative.”  Japan offered to contribute forces from its Japanese Coast 
Guard (JCG) which was technically under civilian control, to alleviate concerns 
about a resurgent militaristic effort.  Japan suggested other members participate, 
including China, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.  After being 
initially well received, the Obuchi Initiative met resistance from China and from a 
number of Southeast Asian states that refused to allow foreign armed vessels 
patrol their territorial waters.  Political opponents of the initiative were quick to 
remember Japan’s brutal wartime occupation and others saw the proposal as a 
just ploy for Japan to counter China’s growing regional influence.  Though the 
political hurdles associated with the venture proved insurmountable, Japan has 
successfully built some bilateral relationships.150   
 In the past five years, Tokyo has convened numerous international 
conferences and organized a series of expert workshops to address maritime 
problems.  Japan has also provided physical support, patrolling jointly with India 
and Malaysia and dispatching the JCG for visits to Singapore, the Philippines, 
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Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.  The JCG has conducted 
anti-piracy exercises with Thailand and the Philippines.  Japan is materially 
assisting Indonesia with development of the Indonesian Coast Guard, reportedly 
as compensation for Indonesia’s participation in bilateral JCG exercises.  Japan 
is also advising Malaysia on the formation of the MMEA and on bringing ports up 
to ISPS Code.151 
Although Southeast Asian states have responded with caution to Japan’s 
maritime security proposals, such as ReCAAP and the Obuchi Initiative, the 
Japanese have successfully heightened regional awareness, provided training, 
equipment, and funding, and engaged regional forces in joint exercises.  
Discourse on the threat of piracy and maritime terror is expanding in all Asian 
states.  Economic recovery in the region should result in the allotment of more 
security resources and a higher priority for anti-piracy efforts.  Even with these 
positive trends, complete multilateral international cooperation will occur only 
when state interests are aligned, and in Japan’s case, Southeast Asian nations 
allay fears of losing sovereignty and influence to Japan.152   
2. China 
China’s relationship with Southeast Asia can be described as an ever-
growing economic interdependency.  China and ASEAN have agreed to 
complete an economic trade free area (FTA) by 2010.  The FTA, launched in 
2002, has already generated a $50 billion increase making ASEAN China’s 
fourth largest trading partner.  Maritime security-wise, China and ASEAN signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional 
Security Issues in 2004.  China is also part of ReCAAP.   China has made slight 
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demarcation of the Beibu Gulf with Vietnam is offered as an example.  More 
recently in 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a tripartite 
agreement for a joint maritime survey of certain South China Sea areas.153    
Militarily, China and the Philippines participated in a joint Search and 
rescue (SAR) tabletop exercise in 2004.  In November 2005, two Chinese ships 
participated in a joint SAR exercise with Indian, Thai, and Pakistani navies, 
marking China’s first overseas exercise inside the territorial waters of the three 
nations.154  More meaningful cooperation is primarily hindered by a lack of 
political trust and territorial disputes.  The mutual economic interests of China 
and Southeast Asia places maritime security in the best interest of both and may 
enrich bilateral and multilateral relationships into more strategic partnerships. 
3. Australia 
Australia is assisting the Philippines with surveillance and plans to begin 
patrolling the Sulu and Celebes Seas in search of terrorists crossing between 
Indonesian and Philippines.  Based on the statements of two JI fugitives who 
trained in the southern Philippines, the hundreds of tiny islands in the archipelago 
are refuges for terrorists who cross the border at will.  According to the Philippine 
National Security Advisor, as many as 40,000 Indonesians could be residing in 
Mindanao.155  The Royal Australian Navy has actively participated in command-
level sea lanes security exercises with a number of regional states.   
Australia and Indonesia also have good working relationship regarding 
anti-terrorism.  The countries have routinized police-to-police liaison.  Together, 
both nations convened the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counterterrorism in 
2004 and are establishing a Law Enforcement Cooperation Center in Jakarta. 
Australia has extended its maritime security zone into Southeast Asian waters to  
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show its strong support for improving regional security.156   Australia remains a 
strong US ally in the region, which facilitates U.S. security coordination with the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
E. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
There are on-going challenges with terrorists. .. it’s clear to me that 
the nexus of this challenge in the Asia Pacific regions is in 
Southeast Asia …  Admiral William J. Fallon, United States Pacific 
Command.157 
After 9/11, the United States declared Southeast Asia the frontline for the 
War on Terror in the Pacific.  Officials were specifically concerned about the 
threat of maritime terror, especially in the Malacca Straits, and have initiated a 
substantial number of policies to address security in that region.  Current terrorist 
activities in the Sulawesi Sea region between the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia have also prompted U.S. participation, particularly military support as 
part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines in the southern Philippines.   
Winning the War on Terror is the highest priority for the United States Pacific 
Command (PACOM). 
1. U.S. Presence 
The United States has made counter-terrorism its number one priority in 
Southeast Asia.  After 9/11, the United States and India used warships to escort 
particularly vulnerable ships, such as LNG tankers, through the Malacca Straits 
in 2001 and 2002.  These efforts were greeted with suspicion by some states, 
seen as an attempt to completely internationalize the straits.  In light of the U.S. 
global war on terror, others felt that a U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia 
may upset the large Muslim community.  On the legal front, authority to take 
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similarly flagged vessels.  Considering that the regional stakeholders have not 
resolved the question of jurisdictional authority, informal U.S. presence served to 
exacerbate the problem. 158 
2. Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
In 2003, the United States introduced the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative (RMSI) in Singapore.  The RMSI was conceptualized as an architecture 
for promoting cooperation and information sharing between voluntarily 
participating nations.  The United States was prepared to assist any Southeast 
Asian nation that asked for help in developing a capacity to deal with illegal 
activities.  Broad in scope, the RMSI among other items, proposed to authorize 
U.S. forces to cooperate with local nations in the pursuit of pirates and maritime 
terrorists, while respecting sovereignty.  The RMSI addressed transnational 
maritime threats by emphasizing information sharing, cueing of emerging threats, 
contributing to security of international seas, and most importantly, creating an 
environment which is hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities.  The RMSI 
attempted to establish protocols and procedures to integrate coast guard and 
navy operations thus eliminating “seams” at sea.159   
Singapore and Thailand welcomed the initiative.  Malaysian and 
Indonesian officials reacted with strong rhetoric to reassert sovereignty when 
local papers incorrectly reported that the PACOM Commander had testified to 
Congress that special forces and marines would autonomously deploy in small-
craft to protect the Malacca Straits.160  Ironically, misgivings by Indonesia and 
Malaysia over RMSI may have prompted cooperation anyway.  Foreign ministers 
from Malaysia and Indonesia met in May of 2004 to discuss the U.S. proposal.  
Shortly thereafter, Malaysia announced that it would float its own version of the 
U.S. coast guard to patrol and safeguard the Malacca Straits.  At the same time, 
Indonesia’s Naval Chief announced that he would set up a joint patrol with 
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Malaysia to safeguard the straits.  The Navy Chief also stated that U.S. patrols 
were not needed; however intelligence exchanges, equipment, and training 
assistance would be welcomed.161   Sovereignty and international involvement 
are two issues which the United States must be treat delicately, as illustrated by 
Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s objections to the formation of the RMSI. 
3. Proliferation Security Initiative 
A more formal measure being undertaken by the United States is the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Eleven core members including the United 
States, Australia, Japan, and Singapore founded the PSI, announced in May of 
2003 by President Bush.  In under three years the membership has climbed to 
over 70 nations.  The United States and other participants under the PSI, seek to 
interdict ships carrying materials involved in the manufacture or delivery of 
WMD’s and bound for or from nations “of proliferation concern.”  “States or non-
state actors of proliferation concern” are determined by PSI participants and 
generally refer to actors engaged in proliferation through (1) efforts to develop or 
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or associated delivery systems; 
or (2) transfers of WMD or related materials.  If a shipment is determined to be 
carrying WMD or related materials to or from a state of concern, PSI participants 
could seek consent to interdict that vessel, even on the high seas.162  The PSI 
specifically states that interdictions will be undertaken consistent with existing 
international law and frameworks, but questions of legality may still arise.  All 
nations are not prohibited from transporting nuclear technology or explosives, 
and all non-commercial ships have immunity from other nations when on the high 
seas.  Some argue that the PSI could also undermine freedom of navigation 
rights granted under UNCLOS.  The United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS but 
has long argued for navigational freedoms and innocent passage.163 
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4. U.S. Bilateral Arrangements 
Like Japan’s proposal for a regional coast guard, the United States cited 
piracy as a reason to move away from bilateral to multilateral military initiatives.  
Notwithstanding, a number of important bilateral relationships continue.  One 
highlight of cooperation is the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force - West (JIATF-
W).  Under the task force, prototype Interagency Fusion Centers (IFC) have been 
established in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.164  IFC’s focus on 
preventing narcotics trafficking and other transnational crimes, but the underlying 
theme is information sharing and coordination between the United States and its 
hosts.   
In 2005, PACOM’s Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 
exercises with Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore focused on 
Maritime Security Operations and Maritime Interdiction Operations.  Exercise 
objectives included the enhancement of interoperability and communications 
between participants with emphasis on maritime security against terrorism and 
piracy, and the development of surveillance, and search and seizure capabilities.  
U.S. Defense Learning Institutes such as the National Defense University and 
Center for Strategic Leadership have also played a role in promoting dialogue 
between regional and U.S. military leaders in an effort to broaden strategic 
partnerships.165 
In 2006, CARAT exercises will be hosted by Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  In addition to conducting maritime law 
enforcement and search and rescue training with the host nation forces, 
Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT) exercises will be 
conducted.  SEACAT focuses on refining maritime security skills, including 
training related to boarding team tactics and techniques, small boat skills,  
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boarding-at-sea and joint boarding capabilities.  The focus is to foster 
cooperation and exchange ideas between the various nation's Naval and Coast 
Guard forces.166 
In addition to CARAT and SEACAT, the United States has capitalized on 
Cobra Gold, a bilateral military exercise co-sponsored by Thailand.  Since 1999 
when Singapore was enticed to join, Cobra Gold has expanded to include 
various other Asian nations each year.  The exercise demonstrates joint and 
multinational capability and interoperability in the performance of UN sanctioned 
peace operations and contingency response.  The annual exercise is a principal 
event for building regional capabilities to respond to security threats of 
humanitarian relief efforts.167 2006 participants included Singapore, Indonesia 
and Japan. 
 Another multilateral PACOM led exercise is the Multinational Planning 
and Augmentation Team (MPAT).  MPAT is a command level exercise aimed at 
facilitating response to crisis in the Asia-Pacific region.  MPAT goals include the 
rapid and effective establishment of a multi-national task force headquarters, 
improved coalition interoperability and effectiveness, and unity of effort.  Since 
2000 when MPAT was initiated, the participation has grown from five nations to 
33 nations in 2005.  Other Southeast Asian exercises such as Cobra Gold may 
employ some level of participation from the MPAT.168 
Additionally with Thailand and the Philippines, the United States conducts 
a Maritime Sea Exercise.  The multi-lateral exercise between the U.S. Navy, the 
Republic of the Philippines Navy, and the Royal Thai Navy focuses on maritime 
surveillance procedures and multi-national interoperability. 
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The United States has recently made large strides with Indonesia.  As a 
response to 9/11, the United States began supporting Indonesian police in 
various technical and training matters, to the tune of $47.5 million from 2001 to 
2004.169  U.S. assistance after the catastrophic 2004 tsunami also precipitated a 
new spirit of cooperation between the two nations.  During the relief effort, U.S. 
officials observed first-hand the state of ill-repair of Indonesia’s military.  The 
United States is now supporting efforts to professionalize and reform the 
Indonesian military as part of the comprehensive “capacity building” program in 
Southeast Asia.   
In December 2005, the United States completed the process of restoring 
military relations with Indonesia by making available Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF).  In February, the International Military Education and Training program 
was resumed with Indonesia for the first time since 1991.170  These programs 
specifically targeted communications and surveillance capabilities of the 
Indonesian military, especially along the Malacca Strait.171  The United States 
has directly supported a number of maritime enforcement measures and plans 
on providing ten 31-foot patrol boats for port security in 2006 along with $1 
million in FMF for the Indonesian Navy.  
The United States and Singapore are major security cooperation partners, 
as outlined in the 2005 “Strategic Framework for a Closer Cooperation 
Partnership in Defense and Security.”172  The Strategic Framework addresses 
key areas in bilateral defense cooperation.  The U.S.-Singapore Capacity 
Building Measures on Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security of March 2005, 
discusses multilateral cooperation, operational solutions, shipping and port 
security, and security technology programs.  The agreement fosters information 
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sharing, establishing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), initiating joint maritime 
exercises, cooperating on consequence management, and sustaining capacity 
building operations.173 
The United States has important bilateral security arrangements with the 
Philippines that aim to directly counter terrorism.  Maritime security training 
efforts include Operation Fusion Piston which covers various aspects of maritime 
law enforcement in support of counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations 
(e.g., first aid, boat maintenance, communications, boat handling, evidence 
preservation, patrolling, insert/extract methods, reconnaissance, and mission 
planning).  Representatives from the Navy SEALS, JIATF-W and other U.S. 
agencies conduct the training for members of the Philippine Army, Navy and 
Coast Guard. 
The United States has deployed over one thousand troops to the southern 
Philippines to advise military units in the fight against ASG.174 
5. Container Security Initiative 
The CSI and other global, U.S.-led technical initiatives will be 
described in more detail in Chapter IV.  In Southeast Asia, Singapore, Port Klang 
and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, and Laem Chabang in Thailand have 
implemented the CSI. 
F. ANALYSIS OF MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES 
Sections B through E above have described security efforts on an 
individual basis.  Each policy is a component of the universal maritime security 
environment.  In fact, much of the dialogue on countering piracy and/or terrorism 
revolves around “coordination” of efforts.  If nothing else, the threat of terrorism 
and the actual attacks in Southeast Asia and around the globe have brought 
about a realization that security is no longer a unilateral proposition.  The 
Malacca Straits have always been strategically important to world trade and 
travel.  The rise of piracy in the 1990’s provoked a number of security efforts.   
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But the war on terror, largely spearheaded by the United States, has prompted 
cooperative security efforts on unprecedented levels.  Different than nation-state 
treatises of old which intended to balance military power, counter-terrorist efforts 
seek to harmonize the public and private sectors against a common enemy, as 
illustrated by the ISPS Code. 
1. Causes for a Decrease in Piracy 
Numerically, total piracy events, including at-sea attacks, have declined 
over the past three years in Southeast Asia (see Tables 1 and 2 above).  
Malacca Straits’ attacks numbered only twelve in 2005 compared to 38 in 2004 
and 28 in 2003.  Attacks in Indonesian waters declined form 121 and 94 in 2003 
and 2004, respectively, to 79 in 2005.  The three reported attacks in Malaysian 
waters in 2005 represent the fewest since 1993.175  Numbers of attacks in the 
territories of the Philippines also declined.  Whether due to the emphasis in 
maritime security by individual states or the increase in cooperative efforts, or 
both, the result has been a definite trend towards fewer total pirate attacks.   
Singapore has been the most aggressive in securing its waters and in 
pursuing multilateral support to secure the surrounding straits.  This is cogent 
since Singapore’s economy is dependent the international flow of commerce 
through its port.  Though piracy in the Singapore Straits has climbed over the last 
two years (eight and seven events compared to two and five the previous two 
years), port security remains effective against maritime crime (zero reported 
piracy incidents in port).  But Singapore’s main concern is the threat of terrorism 
not piracy.   
The Singaporean government has taken seriously the threat of Al Qaeda 
to strike at the United States and its allies.  In response, Singapore has been 
ahead of the region in implementing unilateral efforts, such as its harbor tracking 
system (See HARTS, Appendix A).  Singapore has also led the way in adopting 
international efforts as evidenced by the swift implementation of ISPS standards  
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and CSI.   Singapore has staunchly supported international efforts to assist in 
security, while at the same time promoting ARF as the key instrument for security 
dialogue and cooperation.176    
Singapore’s partiality for involving external bodies to actively participate in 
maritime security has not always been supported or appreciated by the other 
littoral states, most notably Indonesia and Malaysia.  Singapore has even 
employed private security companies to police the Malacca Straits, unbeknownst 
to Malaysia and Indonesia.177  But nonetheless, the cooperation between the 
states has been increasing.  Singapore-Malaysia relations have improved since 
2003, benefiting regional economics and security.  Singapore-Indonesia relations 
have also begun to warm since Indonesia’s elections of 2004.  In the past, 
Malaysia and Indonesia have preferred bilateral cooperation.  Today, the 
Malsindo joint surface and air operations along with improved communications 
and information sharing between the guardians of the straits have enhanced 
awareness of the pirate threat. 
The increase of maritime security by Indonesia can partially be attributed 
to nation-wide crackdown on terrorism.   In the past two years, Indonesia claims 
to have captured over 200 terrorists, most recently 2005 Bali bomber and JI 
leader Azhari bin Husin.  But even the fear of terrorism can not remove all 
barriers to international cooperation.  The seemingly lenient sentence given to JI 
spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, highlights the complexity of dealing with 
transnational crime.  Commenting on Australia’s complaints regarding Bashir’s 
upcoming release in June 2006, Indonesia’s Justice Minister stated that 
“Indonesia is a sovereign country.  Therefore there should not be any 
intervention from the outside.”178  Piracy, even less controversial and emotional a 
topic than transnational terrorism, has evoked much the same type of national  
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response.  While individual and cooperative security progress has been 
measurable, sovereignty issues reign supreme as the main force preventing 
more cooperative operations.   
Besides gaps in policies attributable to sovereignty “borders at sea,” 
Indonesia has had a difficult time balancing external security policies with internal 
political and economic demands.  Indonesia’s vast geography and ethnic 
tensions make it more difficult for the state to focus solely on the maritime 
domain.  But pressures and incentives from the international community along 
with the desire to take a leading role in ASEAN by promoting the ASEAN 
Security Community have prompted Indonesia to step up its unilateral protection 
of the Malacca Straits.179  More robust air and sea patrolling by Indonesia have 
been effective in reducing piracy.180   
Malaysia like Indonesia seeks to limit direct international involvement in 
the Malacca Straits.  While Singapore perceives itself as a potential target of 
transnational terrorism, Malaysia feels that international forces in the region will 
provide a motive for terrorists to attack.  As an indirect measure, Malaysia is 
receiving bilateral capacity building, largely from Japan, in an effort to continue 
strengthening maritime security.  Malaysia’s steady bolstering of patrolling by 
maritime law enforcement agencies over the past few years, and the new 
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency have played a distinct role in reducing 
piracy.181 
2. Causes for Increased Maritime Security 
The majority of Southeast Asian states are on the rise economically.  The 
littoral states understand the importance of keeping commerce flowing and have 
thus encouragingly cooperated toward the goal of maritime security.  Though all 
states generally condemn piracy and terrorism, there are some distinct reasons 
why the states differ on how each is treated.  Singapore has a small area to 
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protect but a relatively large security budget.  Thus technical and procedural 
polices are emplaced rather quickly.  Singapore understands the sovereignty 
issue, but also understands that one catastrophic maritime terrorist attack could 
cripple its economy.  Thus, Singapore aggressively seeks security in a multitude 
of polices, many of which conflate piracy and terrorism. 
Malaysia and Indonesia are more cautious security seekers.  The recent 
warming of relations with other ASEAN states along with economic, international, 
and domestic concerns for terrorism, have spurred regional maritime 
cooperation.  But both states are reluctant to combine piracy and terrorism under 
one umbrella policy, fearing the influx of international involvement that such a 
policy could precipitate.  Instead, capacity building efforts from Western and 
Eastern powers have been accepted as a method to enhance security without 
“stepping on toes.”  Thailand and the Philippines have not made maritime 
security a priority.  Thailand’s internal violence and porous borders have 
occupied its government.  The Philippines is aware that improving maritime 
security would also benefit its anti-terrorist campaign but has not yet built an 
effective sea capability.  Underlying and important to the security of all Southeast 
Asian nation’s is the sharing of information, which has generally trended upward.  
Regional and multilateral initiatives like the 16 nation ReCAAP center, in 
additional to bilateral efforts like PACOM’s three fusion centers, are an obvious 
improvement in maritime security.  Whether to quicken a response or warn of a 
threat, interstate communication and information passing is an integral part of 
effective operations. 
In the private sector, mutual economic interests have also been primary 
drivers of maritime security efforts.  Lloyd’s classification of the Malacca Straits 
as a “war risk” zone and the resultant increased insurance costs added economic 
pressure to the region.  Other international business communities have also 
applied pressure to enhance maritime security because of the vital economic role 
played by the ports and waters of Southeast Asia.  The commercial industry itself 
has become intricately involved with the security effort.  APEC’s STAR and the 
U.S.’s CSI are two examples of commercially based security programs.   
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With regard to physical factors, Southeast Asian governments have 
recognized that its ports and choke points are vulnerable.  Most of the policies 
studied above are designed to improve security in the straits.  Additional radar, 
communications, information sharing, air and sea patrols, and escorts not only 
contribute to port and strait security, but may also reduce criminal sanctuaries in 
the archipelagos.  Efforts to streamline and reform militaries and law enforcement 
agencies, especially by Malaysia and Indonesia, may reduce response time as 
well as governmental complicity.  While elimination of all physical vulnerabilities 
in a congested maritime environment may be impossible, Singapore’s traffic 
control and port segregation efforts are a step in the right direction. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The trend in Southeast Asian maritime security is towards more 
cooperation.  Despite long-standing and active maritime territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea, Singapore Strait, and Sulawesi Sea between a host of nations 
including China, and an attitude of self-sufficiency, a number of cooperative 
efforts have been established on bilateral and multilateral levels.  Having stated 
that, it would be senseless to imagine that traditions of respecting sovereignty, 
traditions promoted by ASEAN and the nations themselves, will disappear due to 
any real or perceived threats.   
Convincing Southeast Asian states, especially those in control of the 
Malacca Straits, to allay fears and suspicions about the intentions of foreign 
naval powers is a lingering challenge.   With regard to foreign powers, memories 
of the colonial era have not completely died.  Most Southeast Asian states have 
waged bloody wars of independence and do not want foreign navies policing 
their territory.  Japan has been one of the strongest proponents for multi-lateral 
anti-piracy security but Japan’s World War II exploits are also remembered.  
Even though Japan has used its civilian-controlled Coast Guard as the 
spearhead for partnerships, complete trust has not been achieved.   
Regionally, suspicions and dislikes swelled during the Cold War.  The 
political turmoil in Southeast Asia was fervent in spite of the fact most nations 
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attempted to remain “officially” non-aligned with Western and Soviet powers.   At 
the same time, ethnic and religious separatism movements embroiled states like 
Indonesia and the Philippines.  ASEAN has assuaged much of the interstate 
tension, albeit via a mantra of peaceful co-existence rather than active and 
interdependent co-operation.   
Southeast Asian states take pride in policing one’s own territory.  The 
recipe of pride combined with a reticence towards regional and international 
jointness has obviously not coalesced into the full cooperation needed to 
optimally maintain security.  Consequently, most Southeast Asian states oppose 
a definition of piracy that would allow foreign nations to enter territorial waters 
without alliance.  By ratifying agreements like the SUA, the door could be opened 
for operational cooperation between member states.  Southeast Asian states 
could benefit from the formal links established with blue water navies, such as 
Japan and the United States.  Agreements would also compel member states to 
formalize prosecutorial and extradition arrangements.182   
Many Southeast Asian states do not have sound and stable enough 
domestic footing to adequately enforce maritime security and counter-terrorism 
policies.  However, this trend is improving.  Numerous modernization programs 
are underway, many bolstered by capacity building measures from foreign 
nations like Japan and the United States.   In the case of Indonesia, a state with 
an acknowledged international terrorist problem, the aggressive pursuit and 
capture of many terrorists, especially the Bali bombers of 2005 including the 
killing of JI leader Azhari bin Husin, is promising.183   
On the international front, stakeholders are pursuing more presence in 
Southeast Asia but must do so in a non-intrusive manner.  The United States 
admittedly is seeking to develop more regional expertise, and more persistent 
intelligence based less on technical collection and more on human interface.  
Nations also continue to pursue multilateral security agreements via the many 
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dialogue avenues available.  There has been a distinct effort, especially by the 
United States, India, and Japan, to increase multilateral military cooperation 
thorough exercises and advisory partnerships. 
This chapter concludes that progress seems to be mounting in the 
maritime security theater of Southeast Asia.  Cooperation is slowly increasing, 
operationally and conversationally, and numbers of piracy events and maritime 
crimes are decreasing.  The challenge for the United States and other interested 
stakeholders is to ensure that Southeast Asian maritime security efforts become 
self-sustaining as opposed to short-lived.  Also, the rise in violent and organized 
pirate tactics has not been sufficiently addressed.  The increase in organization 
may indicate that maritime security policies are aimed more at responding to 
incidents rather than identifying and remedying the sources of violence.  
Hopefully, the renewed set of capacity building initiatives and domestic 
reformation plans will allow for more long-term and deep-rooted preventative 
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IV. MARITIME SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Maritime security is best achieved by blending public and private 
maritime security activities on a global scale into an integrated 
effort that addresses all maritime threats.  The new National 
Strategy for Maritime Security aligns all Federal government 
maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive 
and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, 
local, and private sector entities.184 
A. U.S. MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES  
This chapter provides an overview and evaluation of U.S. maritime 
security.  It is a mistake to think of maritime security as a domestic problem.  The 
world economy moves by way of the maritime infrastructure.  The shipping 
industry typifies globalization more than any other industry; a ship calling at a 
U.S. port may have been built in South Korea, registered in Panama, owned by a 
Greek company, operated by a Japanese carrier, captained by a German, and 
crewed by Filipinos.185  Unquestionably, U.S. maritime security is conjoined with 
the maritime security domains from around the globe. 
The 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking was not the first incident of maritime 
terror, but the fact that an American was killed and the ease at which the ship 
and passengers were seized astonished the U.S. government.  The Achille Lauro 
incident raised concerns which may still be valid today.  In light of a recent port 
security outrage involving the purchase of five U.S. terminals by the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), the threat of maritime terror is once again prominent in the 
headlines.  Is the threat real? 
Some experts believe that the arrests of al-Nashiri and other key members 
of Al Qaeda have significantly disrupted the organization’s future ability to 
conduct coordinated maritime terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, there are fewer 
symbolic targets, the type preferred by Al Qaeda such as the New York’s World 
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Trade Center, in the maritime sector.  Industry experts agree that standalone 
attacks on vessels would have limited economic impact, with the possible 
exception in the civilian sector being cruise liners.  On the other hand, the 
maritime domain is rich with tactical targets for drive-by shootings or small-boat 
attacks, similar to the attack on the USS Cole.  Many soft civilian targets such as 
ferries and cruise ships remain extremely vulnerable.  Realistically, maritime 
terrorist attacks can not be ruled out and as land and airborne security measures 
tighten, more militant groups are turning to the sea for moneymaking and 
logistical operations.186  
But it has taken something more than the act of piracy, maritime crime, or 
even the infrequent maritime terrorist attack to transform the valid concerns of 
the United States into genuine actions.  Proliferation of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear materials and the spread of technology have made the consequences of 
terrorist attack in potential, far more severe.  The DHS’s greatest fear is the 
detonation of a nuclear bomb in one of our major cities, including major seaports.  
In the case of a nuclear bomb detonation, little can be done to mitigate damage 
or improve response, which is why a considerable effort is being made to detect, 
deter, and prevent threats overseas, at the first line of defense.187  For that 
reason, the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) as cited above, 
attempts to metamorphose maritime security into a “comprehensive and 
cohesive national effort,” an effort which has proven to be an elusive target over 
the years. 
1. Importance of Maritime Security 
Approximately 95 percent of the U.S. overseas trade by weight and 75 
percent by value passes through American sea ports annually, accounting for 
two billion tons and almost $800 billion in freight.  Coastal waterways 
accommodate over 100,000 commercial fishing vessels.  U.S. ferries transport 
113 million passengers and 32 million vehicles per year.  The widespread use of 
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cargo containers, one of the most ingenious but uncelebrated engineering feats 
of last century, has turned shipping into the means for globalization.  Worldwide, 
there are 121,000 commercial vessels flying 198 flags going to over 10,000 
destinations with over 5 billion tons of cargo each year.  The container system is 
designed for efficiency, or “just-in-time” replenishment.  About 110 million 
containers cycle through world ports every year.  Approximately 10 million 
containers, carrying 665 million tons of cargo, arrive at U.S. ports.188  
The economic importance of maritime commerce can not be 
overestimated, but perhaps even harder to overestimate is the vulnerability of the 
maritime domain.  In addition to America’s 95,000 miles of coastal waterline, 
there are 12,000 miles of commercially active inland and intra-coastal waterways.  
Many large population centers and critical infrastructures are located near ports 
or waterways.  More than 141 million U.S. citizens live within 50 miles of the 
coast.  America has over 350 seaports of which 50 major ports account for 90 
percent of all tonnage.  There are more than 3,700 cargo and passenger 
terminals, and over 1,000 harbor channels.189  In America’s ports there are over 
50,000 commercial calls per year.  During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, 
90 percent of all military equipment exited from 17 ports.  Some analysts 
estimate that closing U.S. ports for only eight days would cost the U.S. economy 
over $58 billion.190  The above statistics rank the maritime system as one of the 
most critical infrastructures both internationally and nationally. 
2. Overview of National Strategy for Maritime Security 
The majority of post 9/11 maritime security programs originated from the 
MTSA of 2002.  The key programs mandated by the MTSA included the creation  
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of maritime security and response plans, identification of assets at risk, controlled 
access, assessment of antiterrorism efforts at foreign ports, automatic tracking of 
vessels, and evaluation and certification of cargo.191  
In December of 2004, President Bush signed National Security 
Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-
41/HSPD-13) which directed that all U.S. Government maritime security 
programs be coordinated into a comprehensive national plan.  The NSMS, 
signed in September 2005, and eight supporting pillars are based on four key 
premises: 
1)  Physical and economic security of the United States depends on 
secure use of the world’s oceans.   
2)  Security of the maritime domain is the collective responsibility of all 
nations. 
3)  Security of the maritime domain is a shared responsibility of public 
and private sectors. 
4)  Maritime security must address threats from all criminal and hostile 
activities, such as smuggling, piracy, illegal harvesting, terrorism, 
etc. 
The objectives of the NSMS are also divided into four key components: 
1)  Prevent maritime terrorist attacks, hostile acts, and criminal activity. 
2)  Protect maritime-related population centers and critical 
infrastructure. 
3)  In the event of an incident, minimize damage and expedite 
recovery. 
4)  Safeguard the ocean and its resources, assuring continuity of the 
maritime transportation and other economic systems. 
In order to deal with the sweeping array of threats and meet the 
momentous goals, the NSMS outlines a holistic approach to maritime security.  
The NSMS relies on a defense-in-depth or layered strategy which combines 
commercial, military, governmental, and private programs from around the globe.   
In addition to geographical defense-in-depth which extends across the globe, the 
NSMS attempts to functionalize defense-in-depth by embedding security 
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measures into the layers of commercial and public practices.  Beneath the 
layered defense, the NSMS depends on the National Plan to Achieve Maritime 
Domain Awareness as the foundation to support the decision-making chain.  
MDA is “the effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment 
of the United States.”192 
The importance of international and industry cooperation is apparent.  
Perhaps no other security program depends more on global cooperation than the 
NSMS because access to the maritime domain is virtually unlimited.   Also 
obvious is the NSMS reliance on intelligence and information sharing to achieve 
MDA.  Of the eight supporting implementation plans under the NSMS, the 
achievement of MDA is the framework which attempts to unify efforts across the 
U.S. Government, civil authorities, private sector, international allies, and foreign 
trading partners.193 
3. The NSMS in Concept 
One way to conceptualize the NSMS is to envision four phases.  First, 
picture a number of security layers, or measures, such as those discussed in 
Chapter III.  These measures span the maritime domain from naval presence 
abroad to cargo inspection in U.S. ports, and everything in between.  Maritime 
security measures can be implemented via international conventions, interstate 
policies, governmental codes and regulations, industry practices, law 
enforcement procedures, diplomatic or military agreements, technological 
systems, or other maritime-related means.  Indeed, many maritime security 
measures were already in place prior to 9/11; others were developed shortly 
after; others are being developed to fill security gaps and meet NSMS objectives. 
Second, envision the NSMS as the arrangement or construct that 
integrates all the security layers.  The greatest challenge in the NSMS is to 
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coordinate all security measures, including measures that are the responsibility 
of foreign actors and assorted agencies, into a “network of interdependent, 
overlapping and purposely redundant checkpoints to reduce vulnerabilities, as 
well as detect, deter, and defeat threats.”194  Coordination with foreign 
governments is accomplished via the International Outreach and Coordination 
Strategy, and national non-governmental coordination is accomplished via the 
Domestic Outreach Plan, two of the eight NSMS pillars.  In the end, the goal of 
the NSMS is to smooth all seams and fill all gaps between the disparate layers of 
security. 
With security measures defined and coordinated, the third phase in 
achieving maritime security involves threat detection and response.  
Conceptually, achieving MDA will provide situational awareness via a Common 
Operating Picture (COP) to all security agencies.  The intelligence which comes 
across the COP will be provided by the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration 
Plan, the second of eight NSMS pillars.  The next pillar of the NSMS, the 
Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan, covers the actions required 
to engage the full range of maritime security threats to the United States, 
including piracy, terrorism, and any other unlawful or hostile act.  The MOTR 
establishes protocols and procedures for coordinating response by the 
appropriate agency or agencies, such as the FBI and USCG.  Coordination is 
accomplished through a network of integrated command centers at national and 
lower levels.  The MOTR is the NSMS “action mechanism” for preventing 
maritime attacks.   
Fourthly, the NSMS provides for incident mitigation and consequence 
management via the Maritime Transportation System Security, Maritime 
Commerce Security, and Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plans.  Together, the 
NSMS and its eight implementation plans define a broad and overarching 
strategy for securing the maritime domain.  The NSMS is broad in the respect 
that it addresses all maritime threats, not just terrorism, and encompasses all 
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oceans, not just the U.S. coasts and waterways.   The NSMS is overarching 
because it attempts to bridge stakeholders from foreign states, international 
bodies, professional associations, private companies, non-governmental 
organizations, and governmental agencies under one strategy. 
4. Major NSMS Actors 
Patrolling the outer layers of the maritime domain is the U.S. Navy.  The 
GWOT has forced the Navy to develop a more comprehensive posture towards 
maritime security.  With the threat of transnational terror, no longer is the concept 
of minding “one’s own sea lane” the appropriate doctrine.  The Navy has directed 
its worldwide component and joint force maritime component commanders to 
network globally in support of MDA and combat operations.  The U.S. Navy has 
even amended its third priority to include the integration of multi-national and 
commercial maritime industry support into MDA.  Hand-offs between areas of 
responsibility, including information sharing as well as physical transitions, must 
be seamless.195   
There are multiple major players at the final layer of maritime security.  
The primary department is that of Homeland Security, with the USCG and 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as its leading maritime security agencies.  
The DOJ’s FBI is also involved in counter-terrorism and anti-crime efforts at 
America’s borders.  If military assistance is required, DOD’s U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), established in 2002, is responsible for allocating 
military assets to civil authorities.   
Pursuant to the NSMS, National Strategy for Homeland Security, and 
MTSA, the USCG issued Maritime Sentinel in November 2005 as its strategic 
plan to combat maritime terrorism.  Maritime Sentinel incorporates the concepts 
of active deterrence, threat-based risk management, and layered defense in 
undertaking three courses of action - achieving MDA, conducting maritime 
security and response operations, and overseeing the maritime security 
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regime.196  Maritime Sentinel comprises numerous policy, technical, and 
programmatic initiatives, many of which will be explained below.  The key point is 
that maritime security is an extremely complex and vast mission.  
Correspondingly, many of Maritime Sentinel’s initiatives overlap or leverage 
security measures from other bodies, rendering agency collaboration and 
operational coordination as the most significant factors in achieving successful 
maritime security.  For example, the USCG is DHS lead agency for maritime 
security inside of NORTHCOM’s 500 nautical mile coastal jurisdiction, but DOD 
could also be called to play a lead role.  Depending on the location and type of 
threat involved, NORTHCOM may be required to direct military action with other 
agencies taking a supporting role.     
As stated above, the foundation of the NSMS rests upon achieving MDA.  
Exact interagency relationships and responsibilities required to implement the 
National Plan to Achieve MDA are still being worked.  MDA is envisioned on 
three levels - global/national, regional, and local.  On the global/national level, the 
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) collects, analyzes, and fuses inputs 
from a multitude of sources then disseminates intelligence to major actors in the 
DHS, DOD, and other federal departments.  At the regional level, area 
commands such as USCG districts, and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
or CBP command centers receive an operating picture from coastal USCG 
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC) and Area Operation Centers.   On 
the local level, Sector Commands and Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOC) 
disseminate information to port authorities and other tactical action agencies.197  
The COP is the primary method for sharing information between MDA levels and  
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5. NSMS Implementation - Overseas 
a. Cargo Security Initiative  
Overseas, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection requires all sea 
carriers (with the exception of bulk carriers) to provide proper cargo descriptions 
and valid consignee addresses 24 hours before the cargo is loaded on ships 
destined to the United States.  Failure to meet the 24-hour advanced manifest 
rule triggers a “do not load” flag in the Sea Automated Manifest System.   
The CBP initiated the Container Security Initiative in 2002, a core 
U.S. security program which subjects participatory international ports to container 
screenings.  CBP officials are actually stationed overseas in 26 CSI nations, 
currently numbering 42 ports with many more in planning stages.  CSI aims to 
identify high-risk containers via risk-based analysis tool known as the Automated 
Targeting System (ATS).  ATS determines which containers should not be on-
loaded overseas, which containers require inspection at the foreign or the U.S. 
destination port, and which containers are considered low-risk and thus allowed 
expeditious transport.  ATS is the keystone on which CSI and U.S. container 
security rests.  The World Customs Organization, EU and G8 nations have all 
adopted some form of CSI-like security measures.198   
b. Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is an 
initiative in which participating companies agree to certify supply chains in 
accordance with CBP guidelines.  C-TPAT encompasses thousands of importers, 
carriers, brokers, forwarders, manufacturers, ports and terminals.  C-TPAT 
requirements are dependent on business type, but in general, U.S. port and 
terminal operators must implement (and maintain through their supply lines ) the 
following standards to be compliant: conveyance security, container security, 
physical access controls, procedural and personnel security, physical security, 
and information technology security.  Businesses that provide verifiable security 
information are eligible for special benefits such as reduced number of 
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inspections and reduced border wait times, specialized security training and 
advice, reduced inspection rates, exclusion from certain trade-related local and 
national criteria, and other trade-related programs which generally focus on 
streamlining border entry.199 
Security assessments are self-administered and commitments of 
partners to reach up and down supply chains to increase security are 
unenforceable.  Accordingly, the CBP has a cadre of security specialists which 
validate C-TPAT participants and possibly remove C-TPAT status from non-
compliers.  C-TPAT has enrolled over 5,650 companies and has more than 4,700 
companies at various stages of application.  Almost 1,500 validations have been 
completed with another 2,300 in work.200 
c. International Port Security Program 
The International Port Security Program is a USCG effort to work 
jointly with host nations in evaluating the country’s overall compliance with the 
ISPS Code (described in Chapter III).  The USCG renders technical assistance 
and exchanges best practices via on-site visits and dialogue.  As of the end of 
2005, 43 countries have been assessed, including the U.S. largest trading 
partner China, and 35 have been found to be in substantial compliance with the 
ISPS.  The USCG is scheduled to assess approximately 45 nations per year, 
amounting to about 140 trading partners by 2008.201  
6. NSMS Implementation - Securing the Sea Lanes 
a. Advance Notice of Arrival 
Shortly after 9/11, the USCG National Vessel Movement Center 
began operations.  To assist the center with tracking, commercial ships weighing 
300 GT or more are required to notify the USCG 96 hours in advance of arrival at 
a U.S. port.  The 96-hour notice of arrival (NOA), which equates to 1,500 to 2,000 
nautical miles, includes detailed crew, passenger, cargo, and voyage history 
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information.202  NOA and additional information, such as data from the CBP’s 24-
hour advance loading reports, is analyzed using the ATS to identify high-risk 
containers.  The ATS also accounts for crew and vessel illegal activity and the 
security environment in previous ports.  By the time a vessel approaches a U.S. 
port, the USCG has already determined the amount of attention required.203  If a 
vessel is determined to be high risk, the USCG conducts an offshore boarding to 
ensure security issues are resolved.  In addition, random inspections are 
conducted to add the element of unpredictability.  Boarding is done via ship-
based or helicopter fast-rope technique.204   
b. Proliferation Security Initiative 
The Proliferation Security Initiative was discussed in Chapter III. 
7. NSMS Implementation - Protecting the Coastal Infrastructure 
The USCG is the primary DHS agency responsible for safeguarding 
American port facilities and associated vessel traffic.  The CBP is in charge of the 
security of the cargo entering the United States, as well as ensuring that cargo is 
legal.  Outside of ports, the USCG, and air and maritime units from CBP and ICE 
are responsible for patrolling and securing the coastlines.205   
Federal guidelines require terminal operators to maintain basic physical 
security configurations.  The MTSA instructed terminal operators to assess their 
own security requirements based on cargo and equipment type, and other 
function-based criteria, and submit a security plan.  Plans are reviewed and 
approved by the USCG and verified annually.  In the period between July 2004 
which marked the deadline for plans to be in operation and January 2005, the 
USCG inspected over 3,100 facilities in more than 300 ports.  Facility plans 
provide for various physical safeguards such as fences, lighting, alarms, guards, 
water patrols, surveillance equipment, and access control.  Plans must also 
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include periodic drills, exercises, and inspections to test the security 
environment.  Similarly, vessel owners must submit security assessments of their 
ships, and receive USCG approval.  Facility and vessel security plans must be 
coordinated.206 
The Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC) Program is being 
implemented by TSA to credential workers at critical transportation hubs, 
including major ports.  The goal of TWIC is to limit access to vulnerable areas by 
using biometric identification technology.  Ports have not implemented TWIC as 
of yet, but prototype testing has been completed.  TWIC is expected to impact 
the maritime shipping system because access to key areas will be limited to 
credentialed personnel only.  For example, the TWIC must somehow account for 
personnel entering port facilities via truck and rail.207    
There are numerous technological systems being applied to the maritime 
security problem.  This thesis is policy oriented and will not provide a detailed 
appraisal of technology initiatives.  Appendix A lists a sampling of major technical 
programs including initiatives in work or partially underway.  There are also 
various local and state level programs, and public sector programs such as 
Operations Waterways Watch which encourages recreational mariners to report 
any suspicious activity. 
8. NSMS Implementation - Responding to the Threat 
The MOTR assigns overarching responsibilities for threat response.  
When real-time decisions are required, the United States has a number of 
options available.  Depending on the type and location of threat, DOD Combatant 
Commands such as PACOM and NORTHCOM or DHS agencies such as the 
USCG and CBP may be tasked to respond.   U.S. Naval capabilities are patent, 
but less known is that FBI and CBP have developed special maritime response 
capabilities.  Also, the USCG has approximately 13 Maritime Safety and Security 
Teams (MSST) of about 100 members who can perform rapid response missions 
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to vital ports.  MSST’s can be deployed to meet emerging threats and have 
unique anti-terrorism capabilities.  The USCG is upgrading MSST’s into 
enhanced teams (E-MSST) and Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT).  
The USCG hopes to expand specialized force capabilities to provide more 
availability and coastal coverage.208   
Timely response often hinges on effective coordination and 
communication.  Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illustrated that interagency channels 
need to be improved between federal entities, and also between federal, state, 
and local agencies.  This holds true for maritime security, as will be discussed 
below.  At the local level, the USCG along with the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has recently piloted a PortSTEP program to train maritime 
transportation organizations and communities.  The exercises build 
communication and coordination relationships between all agencies that will play 
a role in the event of a maritime transportation incident.  Seven exercises 
occurred in 2005 with 17 more scheduled for 2006.  Area Maritime Security 
Committees will be responsible for managing the PortSTEP network at the local 
level.209 
B. EVALUATION OF U.S. MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES 
Has the NSMS succeeded in uniting a collection of various maritime 
security programs into a coherent, layered defense?  For two reasons, the 
approach to U.S. maritime security has been piecemeal.  Primarily, maritime 
security has not been given the highest national priority.  The NSMS was not 
signed until over four years after 9/11.  Secondarily, assignment of maritime 
security responsibilities has been ambiguous.  The ambiguity has allowed “too 
many to mention” agencies with varying roles to solicit funding from the federal 
and state Homeland Security coffers, often with little regard for other programs.   
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The funding of maritime security is still a problematic issue.  The below 
evaluation analyzes the maritime security situation and offers recommendations 
for improvement. 
1. Maritime Security Funding 
The prime source of federal port funding is the Port Security Grant (PSG) 
Program.  The PSG aims to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the 
protection of maritime critical infrastructure from terrorism, especially large 
explosions and non-conventional threats that would cause large-scale disruption 
to commerce or catastrophic damage.  In 2005 the review process, consisting of 
USCG, Maritime Administration, and state or local government teams, selected 
66 ports for funding in a number of security areas, but with strong emphasis on 
preventing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).210   
The PSG Program distributed $141 million ($516 million since 2002) in 
2005 based on risks and strategic importance.  America’s 129 largest ports were 
evaluated for risk based on three elements: consequence, vulnerability, and 
threat.  Though the matrix was recently reformed, the DHS Inspector General 
reported that 20 projects which did not meet the strategic security priorities were 
still funded.  The IG report stated that additional adjustments to the grant formula 
may be needed, and that some higher-priority projects were not funded because 
there was not enough money.  Other transactions in the 2005 grant distribution 
scheme indicate that port security funding suffers from the same political and 
bureaucratic pressures as many other budget processes.211 
$516 million for port security grants since 2002 appears a sizable amount, 
but airport operators were granted $1.5 billion in 2002 to 2003 to reinforce 
security measures.  The DHS has proposed eliminating all grant programs in 
favor of a risk-based Targeted Infrastructure Protection program.  The DHS plan 
prescribes that state and local governments compete for $600 million which 
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would be split between numerous infrastructures.  After the round of publicity 
caused by the Dubai Ports World (DPW) acquisition attempt, a number of 
congressional bills were introduced to funnel money directly to towards port 
security.  The Greenlane Maritime Cargo Security Act proposed $835 million for 
port maritime security, including $400 million for the grant program.212 
Whether new port security bills will maintain enough traction to move 
forward is yet to be determined, but the maritime security track record has been 
criticized in the past for underfunding.  Since 9/11, the USCG primary missions 
have transitioned from SAR and Drug Interdiction, to SAR and Homeland 
Security.  The increased operational tempo of homeland security missions has 
shortened the life expectancy of many USCG assets.  For example, port and 
coastline security which consumed eight percent of the USCG budget in FY2001 
accounted for 29 percent in FY2005.  GAO reviews have concluded that the 
USCG request for new or upgraded assets is clearly legitimate, but the USCG’s 
Deepwater modernization program has not been fully funded and other budget 
areas, like SAR are being reduced.213  
The government need not bear the entire cost for security measures.  With 
regard to containers, four companies - Hutchison Port Holdings of Hong Kong, 
PSA Singapore terminals, Dubai Ports World, and APM Terminals of Denmark - 
handle approximately eighty percent of U.S. bound containers.  Hutchison has a 
strong record for advocating container security programs.  Besides political 
pressure, these companies could fund screening and inspection measures by 
implementing user fees.  Similar to the manner in which additional passenger 
fees are funding airline security measures, container fees could pay for port 
terminal enhancements.214   
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2. Maritime Security Jurisdiction 
It is understandable why initial attempts to formulate a coherent maritime 
security strategy would lean towards over-assigning responsibilities, or assigning 
multiple agencies with the same areas of responsibility.  The priority after 9/11 
was to plug any and all gaps.  The establishment of the DHS, NORTHCOM, 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other entities was part of 
national effort to construct a protection system for the United States.  By 
compounding multiple departments into a “concerted national effort,” the 
government has actually increased its options for response.  The absence of 
clear lanes of responsibility allows the President to determine which threats can 
be met by law enforcement and which by military.  Multiple options and 
redundant security layers can be an advantage; uncertain lines of authority can 
be a detriment.215   
Outside U.S. waters, the same concerns that hamper the nations of 
Southeast Asia from clearly defining responsibilities and procedures apply to 
U.S. authorities.  There are five recognized principles which generally allow a 
nation to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Terrorism aimed directly at the United 
States meets the threshold for the protective principle, in which the offence 
threatens the vital interests of the prosecuting state.  Piracy on the other hand is 
less clear.  If the act of piracy is condemned by a convention or treaty which the 
United States and the state in question are both party to, then the universality 
principle may apply.  As example, if a piracy takes place in Mexican waters, the 
United States does not have jurisdiction and DOS would coordinate with Mexico 
if the FBI wanted to participate in the investigation.  But if the act was committed 
against an American yacht, the FBI may have certain extraterritorial rights.  If the 
act was declared to be terror against an American, the FBI would have clear 
rights of investigation (anywhere).216   
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Who’s in charge of maritime security within U.S. waters?  Confusion over 
U.S. maritime jurisdiction is rooted in the 2002 MTSA and 2005 NSMS.  In 
attempt to deploy layered security, the NSMS states that the “Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice, 
as well as the department of State when diplomatic activities are required, will 
lead the United States’ efforts to integrate and align all … [U.S.] maritime security 
programs and initiatives…”  The NSMS then proceeds to address transnational 
threats by directing the DOD and DHS to “develop a mutually agreed process for 
ensuring rapid, effective support to each other.”217  Even without the threat of 
terrorism, distributing responsibilities over the complexity and scope of the 
maritime domain presents a formidable challenge.  The establishment of 
NORTHCOM has geographically divided responsibilities for the DOD.   But DOD 
and DHS responsibilities with regard to the United States area of responsibility 
overlap.  DOD has attempted to clarify authority and responsibility issues with 
DHS by developing Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities and the DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept.  But until 
DHS is resourced for every counter-terrorism mission, such as airborne security, 
the responsibility overlap must remain.218   
Other jurisdictions are even less clear.  A recent DOJ Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) report warned that the FBI and USCG have overlapping 
jurisdiction with regard to responding to terrorist acts within the littorals.  The 
USCG MSST’s and the FBI’s 14 Enhanced Maritime Special Mission Teams are 
both capable of responding to a threat.  Ordinarily, redundancy in a security 
system is viewed as a plus.  The OIG report concludes that jurisdictional issues 
have not been resolved and could be a problem during a terrorist incident.  
Earlier this year, an FBI director testified before Congress that “the FBI is 
responsible for coordinating the activities of other members of the law 
enforcement community to detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist attacks.  In 
addition, the FBI is lead MOTR agency for intelligence collection in the United 
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States…responsible …to integrate all U.S. maritime security programs and 
initiatives into a comprehensive, cohesive national effort.”219  Far better to have 
more than one agency leading the response effort than none at all, but the issue 
must be resolved. 
Undefined authority also complicated the worker identification program 
(see TWIC, section A.7 above).  Originally scheduled for 2004, ID card roll-out is 
not expected until 2007.  Confusion over local versus federal requirements, cost-
sharing and funding, and alternatives has delayed TSA’s implementation plan.  
The miscellaneous incoherent nature of the cargo security initiatives can also be 
partly attributed to unclear delegation of responsibilities.  Though plans like CSI, 
C-TPAT, TWIC, etc. are all effective on some level in their own right, a unified, 
synergistic plan is not in place.220   
3. Maritime Port Security 
In February 2006, Dubai Ports World (DPW) purchased a British-owned 
company.  The deal placed control of facilities in five U.S. ports in the hands of 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government.  The sale provoked outrage from 
pundits and politicians alike because two 9/11 hijackers were from the UAE, a 
country formerly used by Al Qaeda as a financial hub.  Foreign control of the 
ports was later circumvented when the UAE’s Vice President transferred 
ownership to a U.S. entity.  Whether right or wrong, the DPW incident served to 
highlight port security, or port insecurity as some contended, in America. 
Does the operation of U.S. port terminals by foreign governments or 
businesses a present a threat?  Considering that in the seventeen largest U.S. 
container ports, 66 percent of the terminals are operated by foreign companies, 
the United States may be missing the big picture.  Most terminals are managed 
by foreign companies because almost all shipping lines are owned by foreign 
companies.221  In actuality, by effectively thwarting the DPW deal the United 
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States may have missed an opportunity.  DPW offered to provide additional 
guarantees to protect the terminals in question.  If the U.S. government forced 
DPW to agree to install scanning and radiation equipment not only at the five 
American terminals, but also at its 41 terminals in the Middle East, Asia, North 
and South America, then security could have been improved.  This would not 
have been an unrealistic request.   In Hong Kong for example, Hutchison Port 
Holding’s terminals electronically inspect 100 percent of incoming containers and 
even record the digital images into a file for use in investigation, when 
warranted.222   
U.S. seaports and surrounding areas have been accustomed to crime.  In 
2000, cargo theft from around port areas was estimated to be about $10 billion.  
Smugglers have been known to employ a strategy of employing trusted exporters 
to transport items such as narcotics into the country.  Drug smugglers normally 
look for long-term arrangements, allowing the USCG and CBP to look for specific 
patterns.  Terrorists on the other hand may likely use a particular method to 
attack only once.  Given the tremendous amount of cargo arriving at America’s 
seaports, searching for a WMD is like searching for a needle in a haystack 
regardless of terminal or port ownership nationality.223  
The potential threat posed by foreign or domestic ownership and operation 
of U.S. port facilities really depends upon the allegiance of the hired workers.  
Theoretically, a foreign company may gain knowledge of day-to-day port 
operations by owning a terminal, but terrorist groups could acquire the same 
information by working at a port, coaxing a laborer to talk, or researching.  The 
bottom line is that U.S. ports already depend on foreign entities for security.  
Three major programs, CSI, C-TPAT, and ISPS Codes, require foreign 
companies and authorities to implement and enforce security standards.224   
Physical security of ports is also a challenge.  Perimeter security at ports 
varies; expectedly, fences, surveillance systems, and security guards are not of 
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the highest “bank-like” quality.225  Even if perimeter security was tight, ports by 
nature have numerous avenues of access to allow on- and off-loading.  If access 
programs like TWIC are forced to issue so many cards that the identification 
system itself becomes compromised, then port security will too be compromised. 
4. Ship and Cargo Security 
With much of the effort aimed abroad, maritime security measures for 
American cargo have lagged.  Under CSI, while 100 percent of containers are 
screened by reviewing shipment data, only five to six percent of containers are 
inspected using x-ray or gamma ray technology, or by physically devanning 
(unloading the container).226  In November 2005, the CBP Commissioner stated 
that screeners were inspecting 100 percent of the right five percent of containers.  
In theory, security programs such as CSI’s 24-hour advance manifest rule and C-
TPAT provide supply chain safeguards, allowing CBP to devote its resources to 
the high-risk shipments.  However, C-TPAT participation is voluntary and 
membership is primarily comprised of companies that operate in the United 
States.  Considering that decisions as to which containers are inspected under 
CSI are partially informed by C-TPAT information, the claim of near perfect 
intelligence seems suspect.  Terrorists can easily discover which “trusted” 
companies receive no container inspections and exploit those companies.  A 
WMD could be placed in a containerized shipment in a number of ways, prior to 
or after the port inspection process.227   
Even if terrorists are not resourceful enough to exploit lower risk 
containers and cargo, a recent study found that a “disturbingly low” number, 37 
percent, of high-risk containers were being inspected abroad.  More importantly, 
the effectiveness of the ATS in selecting high risk containers can not be verified.  
“The CBP has not yet put key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance 
that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing containers with the highest risk of 
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containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction.”  In addition to ATS software 
and integrated system shortfalls, the CBP has not been able to persuade 
longshoremen at some West coast ports to stage containers in a manner which 
accommodates inspection.228   
Even when cargo initiatives are in place, security measures may not be 
completely sound.  Reportedly, a recent DHS study discovered that cargo 
containers can be opened secretly while enroute to the United States.  Other 
weak links in the system are the chain of custody and accompanying 
documentation.  Truck drivers in some countries were permitted to take 
containers home over night.  Merchant crews lacked credentials.  Private 
companies as well as a number of foreign governments were found to be 
complicit in the neglecting of security procedures.229  But this should not be a 
surprise or an indictment.  In America, four federally contracted employees 
embezzled millions of dollars designated to a border surveillance system.230  In 
any system involving human interaction, no matter how well intentioned, there 
will exist opportunities for corruption or negligence. 
By the same token, technical measures like in-port radiation detection and 
X-ray type screening devices are not foolproof.  Nuclear bombs are well shielded 
and dirty bombs can be encased in lead.  In order to be detected, the weapon 
must have a large signature.  If sensitivity of screening devices is increased, then 
the amount of false positives could theoretically overwhelm port operations.  The 
same type of slowdown would occur if U.S. customs officials were to inspect a 
statistically significant number of containers entering the nation.  Security by its 
nature is inconvenient; currently there is no feasible 100 percent solution to the 
cargo security problem.231 
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Bulk carriers and tankers are not subject to the 24-hour rule.  Tankers, the 
LNG type oft cited as possessing the most destructive potential, are suspected 
targets due to the explosive characteristics of the cargo.  In a worse case 
scenario, one study estimated that as many as 8,000 deaths could result from an 
LNG terminal explosion in Providence, RI.  If not perfectly executed, most 
terrorist attempts to explode an LNG tanker would result in fire, causing less but 
still significant damage than worst case.  Currently, only four onshore LNG 
terminals exist in the United States but with the projected increase of import, 
there are 40 proposed LNG terminals. If proximity to market is used a 
determining factor, then ports near major population centers may be selected.232 
In order to be effective against the threat of transnational terrorism, the 
bulk of ship and cargo security policies must migrate to overseas ports, foreign 
ships, and up supply chains.  CSI and C-TPAT must continue to expand in 
processing capacity, geographic coverage, and participation.  Equivalent security 
programs must be developed for bulk carriers.  Besides expanding, partnership 
programs like C-TPAT must not allow importers to lessen U.S. inspection and 
screening requirements without guaranteeing improved security.  Robust 
validation processes must coincide with any incentive program.233  
Acknowledging that U.S.-led global initiatives such as CSI are costly for foreign 
ports and ship owners to implement, economic incentives must be included, as is 
done with C-TPAT.  The United States must find ways to build overseas 
presence in order to audit programs, without provoking hostility.  Even the USCG 
International Port Security Program has engendered ill will at times, prompting 
some reticence in the international community with regard to maritime 
security.234   
At the same time, the United States must keep insulating homeland 
infrastructure.  One proposed solution to the threat of WMD-laden cargo and 
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ship-as-weapon scenarios is to develop a system of off-shore floating ports.  The 
port system would allow inspection of cargo before it reaches America’s shores.  
Some percentage of cargo from foreign ships could be off-loaded, scanned, and 
placed on barges destined for nearby ports.  Certain foreign vessels would never 
reach America’s shores.  Though the concept sounds impractical, offshore ports 
are constructible and would add another layer to the defense-in-depth 
concept.235  There may be more practical ways to decentralize the critical 
maritime infrastructure, such as expanding smaller ports or distributing cargo 
type more evenly.  What is impractical is sanitizing every governmental, 
commercial, and private vessel on America’s waterways.  Without perfect 
intelligence, the threat of maritime terrorism will always be bona fide. 
5. Maritime Security Awareness  
Achieving perfect MDA may be a lofty goal, but there are two aspects to 
the problem.  The collection of information necessary to provide an “effective 
understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain” is in itself 
a daunting task.236  Be that as it may, it was not intelligence collection but rather 
the faulty process of information analysis and intelligence sharing that was 
determined to be a primary cause for 9/11.  Though all details of MDA ownership 
and responsibility have not been firmly established, the “intelligence failure” 
message has been relayed to all interested parties.  At the national and regional 
levels, the processing and disseminating of information is taking place.  At the 
local level, interagency operational centers, representing DHS, DOD, and DOJ 
agencies, have been established at a number of ports and operate 24 hours per 
day.  The JHOC in Hampton Roads, VA, is the latest to open.  The center, 
lauded as a model by the USCG, houses the latest surveillance and 
telecommunications technology.237  Area Maritime Security Committees,  
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prescribed by the MTSA, have facilitated information sharing between federal 
and nonfederal stakeholders by establishing communications structures and 
information sharing procedures.238   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of 9/11, the United States has significantly ameliorated 
maritime security.  Dramatic progress has been made on a number of technical, 
procedural, and cooperative fronts.   The GWOT defense-in-depth strategy has 
forced key security measures to the far reaches of the globe because if a WMD 
is discovered upon arrival at a U.S. port, it may be too late.  The maritime arena 
has also benefited from promulgation of international policy, such as ISPS Code.  
Though differences of opinion exist as to the prevention, response, and 
prosecution of maritime crime, there is international agreement that maritime 
terror must not be tolerated.  This consensus, along with U.S. urging, has 
propelled tremendous activity in the maritime security domain. 
Substantial progress has been made but it is fair to say that due to the 
lower priority given to domestic maritime security, that implementation of the 
national strategy is not finished.  Congress has drafted numerous critical 
infrastructure protection bills, most recently the National Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2006 which deals with issues of ownership, 
management, and operation of critical infrastructure.   But the “big picture” has 
not been honestly analyzed.  The maritime domain is the backbone of the global 
economy.  Rationally, a risk-based decision matrix which considers strategic 
importance would place maritime security at or near the top.  Unfortunately, the 
9/11 Commission graded homeland security funding as an “F” on the December 
2005 report card because security funds have yet to be allocated on a risk-based 
scale.  Setting aside risk criteria, maritime security programs have still been 
underfunded given the security mandates set forth by MTSA, NSMS, and 
subordinate directives.  Optimistically, the recent discussion over port terminal 
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ownership will concentrate attention on maritime threats and vulnerabilities long 
enough for security issues to be properly ranked and funded by risk and 
importance. 
In addition to the direct cost of security programs, U.S. security policies 
must take into account economic impact.  The just-in-time nature of shipping 
makes the balance between security and commerce a precarious one, but it is a 
balance which can be tilted to America’s advantage.  The important role that the 
maritime domain plays in the economies of foreign countries has served as the 
catalyst for conformance and participation in port, cargo, and shipping initiatives.  
The United States must continue to leverage its economic strength by aligning 
maritime security measures such as CSI with the best economic interests of 
trading partners.   
Incentivizing security performance with economic reward, such as “fast 
tracking” cargo, will compel policy compliance and widen inclusiveness.  CBP 
estimates that by the end of 2006, between 80 and 90 percent of containers 
entering the United States will have departed from CSI ports.  The next step is to 
develop a failsafe CSI screening and inspection process.  Obvious weak points in 
the container system, such as packing integrity, custody chain from product 
source to dispatch port, terminal access procedures, documentation, etc. must 
be solidified.  Control and credentialing of stevedores and ship crews must be 
tightened.  Security codes must not only be emplaced, but also rigidly enforced.  
Securing the maritime commerce system will involve much more than 
governmental resources. 
From the beginning of the GWOT, the United States has asserted that 
commercial entities must play a role in security.  C-TPAT provides a sound 
framework for commercial security initiatives because supply lines and working 
relationships are already defined.  Rigor must be instilled into commercial 
programs by making non-participation and non-compliance more costly than 
conformance.  The brunt of commercial program responsibilities must be placed 
on foreign companies.  As aforementioned, a great opportunity was missed when 
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the U.S. dodged the DPW port deal instead of convincing DPW to install state-of-
the-art security measures at the terminals, including worldwide locations.  “At the 
end of the day, America’s port security is not about who is operating on our 
waterfront.”  The main issue is self-policing by commercial companies with 
limited oversight or enforcement capacity by the U.S. authorities.239   
On the topic of authorities, the United States must resolve interagency 
jurisdictional issues.  The maritime threat might be ambiguous, but the security 
plan must be clear.  To be fair, the NSMS is newly published.  Operating norms 
and formalized responsibilities are still being established between DHS, DOD, 
and DOJ agencies, as well as other entities.  Interoperability, communications, 
and procedures are being exercised.  The capability and capacity of federal, 
state, and local maritime security forces are expanding.  The highest 
administrative priority must now be to delouse the chains of command so that 
resources can be applied effectively to prevention, response, and consequence 
management endeavors. 
Can and will U.S. maritime security ever expand to provide complete 
coverage?  The vastness and complexity of the maritime domain provide plenty 
reason for skepticism.  Achieving perfect MDA for instance, seems improbable 
regardless of the amount of human intelligence and technical initiatives thrown at 
the problem.  Security emphasis has been placed squarely on the commercial 
sector but what about the about private craft at a public marina?  Analogous to a 
vehicle-borne IED (car bomb), a weapon can be placed into a small, private boat 
and rammed into a ship with little or no warning.  The small boat attack is the 
exact scenario that Al Qaeda performed twice off of Yemen; means of stopping a 
small boat attack are very limited.  
Even if all concerned agencies were given all requested resources and 
implemented all desired policies, the ingenuity of the terrorist threat remains a 
wild card.  Most of the maritime security measures discussed in this chapter have 
been external to the ships.  Akin to the airline industry, ship’s crewmembers and 
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passengers may be the last line of defense against a terrorist attack.  During 
piracy, crewmembers tend to placate the attackers not wanting to endanger their 
own lives.  This approach may backfire if the perpetrators are actually terrorists 
seeking to hijack a supertanker and crash it into a port, a lesson learned painfully 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. 
MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 
This thesis has argued that piracy tactics and trends represent a legitimate 
concern to the United States which must be addressed when developing 
maritime counter-terrorism policy.  The study of sea piracy tactics and the 
maritime terror threat, primarily in Southeast Asia, has illuminated a number of 
issues which are relevant to U.S. maritime security.  Likewise, the security 
polices emplaced to prevent piracy and maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia 
have implications for U.S. maritime security policy.    
1. Long-term Implications  
The maritime security strategy in Southeast Asia has been effective in 
increasing awareness of piracy and reducing total numbers of attacks.  But many 
of the maritime security policies, such as increased patrolling, are aimed at 
tactical prevention of sea piracy and other forms of sea crime or maritime terror.  
Though maritime patrols can reduce criminal incidents in the short-term, it is 
sufficient to say that in addition to tactical maritime security policies, Southeast 
Asia and the United States need long-term strategic solutions.  The global war on 
terror is now being called the “long war.”  A long war has extremely significant 
implications for the maritime security strategy.  Besides the expectation of a long 
war, the ubiquitous nature of piracy and maritime terror implies that security 
forces must change into a more omnipresent force.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
a transformation of naval forces is beginning in Southeast Asia as nations 
attempt to increase capability.  Examples of Southeast Asian transformation are 
improved surveillance and communications systems, information sharing centers, 
and force training and mariner awareness programs. In addition to building 
capacity in Southeast Asia, the United States has recognized that a 
transformation of its own naval forces into a more agile and versatile fleet will be 
needed.  The goal of long-term transformation must be to permanently influence 
the maritime domain, not merely respond quickly to a maritime incident. 
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Reshaping security forces solves only one part of the puzzle.  Another 
long-term strategy which will benefit maritime security is that of resiliency, making 
the maritime infrastructure less susceptible to severe consequences in the event 
of an attack.  Resiliency can be achieved by dispersing and diversifying shipping, 
using alternative routes and product sources, and by employing a variety of 
shipping methods.  For example, major energy consumers like China and Japan 
should find ways to cushion their economies if the flow of traffic through 
Southeast Asian choke points is interrupted.  Besides building strategic oil 
reserves, projects such as the Thailand’s “Strategic Energy Land Bridge,” 
scheduled for completion in 2010, will provide an alternative route for Middle 
Eastern oil to reach East Asia.  The pipeline will cut more than 600 miles off the 
shipping distance and allow shippers to bypass the Malacca Straits.240  
Regardless of sector - energy, food, etc, - building alternative sources and 
strategic reserves, along with diversification of shipping routes and methods, 
should be an integral part to long-term maritime security strategy. 
Another long-term policy implication for the United States is that 
intelligence partnerships will play a key role in preventing maritime terror.  In fact, 
the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) played 
a part in warning Indonesia about a heightened risk of attack on its hotels prior to 
Jakarta’s J. W. Marriott bombing in 2003.  The intensified security at the hotel 
panicked the terrorists, causing the attackers to detonate the car-bomb 100 feet 
further away from the hotel than planned.241  Besides government-to-government 
sharing of intelligence, commercial sector-to-government information sharing 
must continue to upswing.  Since the commercial sector owns the majority of 
large sea-going vessels and is most likely to be exploited by maritime terrorists, 
partnerships are essential if effective databases and warning systems are to be 
developed.  Technology will undoubtedly be integral to information collection,  
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both governmental and commercial, but the United States must be cautious of 
over-relying on technical means of collection since much of the maritime industry 
is not modernized or standardized. 
Along the same lines as intelligence sharing, a counter maritime terrorism 
strategy must develop and employ a system of indications and warnings.  
Southeast Asia’s environment provides a rich resource for the study of maritime 
crime and terror.  Suspicious events such as pirates steering the Dewi Madrim in 
2003 or reports of suspected terrorists taking diving instruction must be analyzed.  
Terrorism, including transnational terrorism, has a number of processes which 
serve as indicators.  Steps in a typical maritime operation may include team 
assembly, operative infiltration, target selection, reconnaissance, recruitment of a 
subject matter expert, provision of funds, technical training, purchase of special 
items, rehearsal, final preparations, reconnaissance, communications, and 
execution.  Each step represents a terrorist vulnerability to actionable 
intelligence.  The challenge will be developing intelligence collection and analysis 
schemes to identify these steps. 
Nearly five years has passed since 9/11, yet Southeast Asia and the 
United States are still struggling to resolve sovereignty and jurisdictional 
problems, as well as legal issues in the international maritime domain.  The fact 
that a great deal of dialogue has occurred is a promising first step in the long-
term process of recognizing and eventually resolving issues of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction.  Even in the face of legal incongruity, the enhancement of maritime 
security policies has to large extent conflated anti-piracy and counter-terrorism 
measures under one tactical blanket.  As demonstrated in Southeast Asia, many 
of the tactics used by pirates may be readily adaptable to maritime terror and 
thus, many of the counters, such as increased patrolling, can prevent either act.  
The long-term strategic implication, as stated in the U.S. National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, is that a comprehensive maritime security policy which will 
secure the seas from all threats can be developed on some levels.  For example, 
counter-terrorism policies can be linked with other security programs such as 
counter-narcotics and human trafficking prevention programs. 
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2. Near-term Implications 
In the near-term, the upward trend in violence and sophistication of 
maritime attacks hold relevant implications for U.S. maritime security policy.  As 
is happening in Southeast Asia and in the United States, the training and tactics 
of maritime security forces are becoming more complex.  In attempt to combat 
the unknown terrorist threat, military and law enforcement agencies are being 
compelled to cooperate in order to bring more capabilities and alternatives to 
bear.  Agencies are also being tasked to broaden areas of responsibility.  Until 
steady-state programs and operational postures are clarified and instilled, 
security forces must remain flexible. 
Southeast Asian piracy incidents illustrate that ships are more vulnerable 
to attack when anchored or moored in port, or while slowed to transit congested 
traffic areas and chokepoints.  This implication has caused a large proportion of 
the maritime security effort to be focused on channel and port security.  Long-
term policies are being developed to implement more persistent protection 
measures such as traffic de-confliction schemes, surveillance and vessel 
monitoring systems, consequence management, and communications plans.  
Until robust security plans are established and integrated maritime domain 
awareness is achieved, harbor and strait patrols, quick response procedures, 
and vigilance will play a large part in port, harbor, and channel security. 
Even with robust security procedures entrenched, terrorists may not be 
deterred.  The last line of defense may be the responsibility of the crewmembers.  
In Southeast Asia, crewmembers have not played a significant role in preventing 
maritime crime.  The lesson for the United States should parallel the airline 
industry’s example - protecting crews and enabling crews to protect themselves 
also prevents attacks.  Technological initiatives are being applied to ship 
protection, but for the most part, crewmembers remain an ineffective deterrent to 
piracy or maritime terror.242     
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. MARITIME SECURITY POLICY 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security outlines an ideal plan to 
secure the world’s seas and protect America’s interests from any type of 
maritime crime.  A more realistic appraisal of the strategy reveals that the primary 
objective of U.S. maritime security policy is to prevent a catastrophic terrorist 
event caused by a WMD reaching America’s shores.  In itself, this is not a flawed 
strategy because many counter-terrorism measures generate the by-product of 
maritime security in general.  In the past the United States has never had to 
focus on maritime crime because the impact on U.S. interests was relatively 
insignificant.    Prior to 9/11, U.S. attempts to combat piracy were lacking.  The 
USCG participated in regional seminars and workshops and contributed to the 
writing of at-sea piracy circulars for the International Maritime Organization.  But 
as discussed in Chapter II, most piracy does not occur at-sea but rather in 
foreign ports, which was true for seventy percent of the incidents in the years 
immediately prior to 9/11.243  Post 9/11, U.S. and foreign port security has come 
to the forefront of the maritime security agenda.  Overseas counter-terrorism 
initiatives such as the ISPS Code, CSI, and Singapore’s vessel tracking system 
can definitely benefit overall maritime security, including the prevention of 
maritime piracy and crime.  So although the United States prescribes a 
comprehensive global effort to protect all the world’s maritime trade from all 
threats and ensure security across the entire spectrum of the maritime domain, 
the true aim of U.S. policy should remain exactly as stated; Preeminent among 
our national security priorities is to take all necessary steps to prevent WMD from 
entering the country and to avert an attack on the homeland.244 
With the prime directive of preventing a WMD attack at the forefront, the 
following recommendations are offered to improve U.S. maritime security: 
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1. Foreign Ports and Waters - The Outer Layers of Defense 
Capacity building has a much more positive connotation than foreign aid 
or assistance.  The United States should welcome the new label and leverage 
the invitation to bolster security across the globe.  Whether through bilateral or 
multilateral efforts, the United States should trade capacity building programs for 
improvement in security frameworks.  As an example, Southeast Asian capacity 
building efforts such as those in Indonesia are encouraging, but the region 
represents only a small fraction of the totality of maritime activity.  On a global 
scale, the United States should offer America’s ports (easier access) as the 
incentive to impose foreign port security initiatives.  As the largest importer in the 
world by far, America has the leverage to force change.  To some extent, this is 
already being done with regard to containers via CSI, but similar measures must 
be imposed across the entire range of imports.  It makes little sense to inspect 
one hundred percent of U.S.-bound containers for nuclear bombs when tankers, 
bulk carriers, and other private vessels receive little to no scrutiny.245  As 
initiatives are instituted, technical loopholes and gaps must be plugged.  All 
projections show maritime commerce as growing in scope and importance.  The 
capacity exists for the system itself to pay for the cost of increased security.    
Regardless of the amount of physical and procedural security 
mechanisms in place, there will always exist some level of vulnerability.  The 
United States is counting on intelligence to bridge the gaps in security.  This 
thesis will not belabor the post 9/11 critique of the intelligence community, except 
to stress that the achievement of maritime domain awareness unquestionably 
relies on interagency cooperation, along with unfettered flow of information from 
all private and foreign sources to the intelligence community. 
2. International Waters - The Mid Layers of Defense 
In January 2006, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations described a maritime 
domain which is “getting smaller every day.”  Referring to the increasing 
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importance of the maritime domain and its security, the CNO envisioned a 1,000-
ship Navy as part of a “world fleet of like-minded navies and coast guards 
teaming up in a sort of global neighborhood watch.”246  Transformation has been 
the military “buzzword” since 9/11 and the Navy must transform if it is serious 
about safeguarding the United States from maritime terror.  The U.S. Navy must 
shift from a mindset of pure power projection to a mindset of balanced capability 
and persistent presence.   
At the seams of international and territorial waters, the Navy should use 
the recently established Naval Expeditionary Combat Command to harness 
security skill sets and expand security operations not only into foreign waters, but 
also onto America’s own shores.  There are already widely accepted 
mechanisms in place, such as Search and Rescue training and exercises, which 
will allow increased U.S. Navy and Coast Guard participation overseas.  Under 
any umbrella, increased participation yields enhanced interoperability, 
communication, trust and cooperation - all key elements to a global maritime 
security structure.  PACOM’s exercises (Cobra Gold, SEACAT, MPAT) provide 
prime examples. 
Since no number of ships can cover the full expanse of the globe, 
technological and other security initiatives must be continued.  Progress is being 
made with tracking and warning systems for large international ships.  The 
United States should give economic incentives or offer easier access to all U.S.-
bound foreign ships equipped with cooperative tracking systems, and also 
meeting other security criteria such as heightened credentialing standards.  With 
the proper mix of presence and technology, the world’s maritime domain truly 
can be made “smaller.” 
3. American Ports and Waters - The Inner Layers of Defense 
The most vital cog in the maritime security system is the defense of 
America’s homeland.  Because of the lucrative and accessible target set afforded 
by the build up of population and infrastructure on the coastline, the threat of 
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maritime terror must not be overlooked.  The maritime transportation system is 
not functionally divisible.  Cargo security measures impact vessel security 
measures which in turn affect port security, and so forth.  Therefore, the United 
States must overcome any bureaucratic barriers and resolve all jurisdictional 
disputes in order to effectively protect America’s ports and waterways.  Even 
traditional restraints on the U.S. Navy such as the Posse Comitatus Act must be 
re-evaluated.  If Posse Comitatus was reformed for specific circumstances only, 
such as “at-sea” security, the broadening of capacity and capability would 
provide the government with more security options.  Corresponding efforts to 
enable maritime security and threat response options for DHS, DOJ, and other 
DOD assets should be considered. 
At the same time, a tightening of command chains must occur.  Though 
functional maritime areas overlap, lines of authority should not.  Northcom has 
taken steps to clarify the DOD’s role in civil support, but events such as 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that confusion still exists.  Even after official 
lines of authority are defined, the maritime security forces face the enormous 
challenge of bringing private sector entities into compliance.  Initiatives like C-
TPAT which align economic and security interests fall short of ensuring 
compliance.  Even when technical cargo security programs reach full capacity, 
there will exist human interface vulnerabilities such as dock workers, 
crewmembers, and other personnel.  Full compliance on all levels will be 
required to safeguard the complexities of U.S. port systems and related maritime 
infrastructure.  
4. Ship Defense - The Last Line of Defense 
Concerning piracy, attacks are usually committed by armed perpetrators.  
In the past, ships have defended with lights, alarms, signal flares, and fire hoses.  
Ship owners are primarily concerned with the safety of the cargo and care less 
about pilfering and small-scale robbery, the most common type of piracy, than 
hijacking or kidnap-for-ransom.  Overall, crews have been a relatively ineffective 
deterrent to piracy.  If ship owners could protect crewmembers, maritime crime 
and terrorism could be foiled.  One recommendation is to hold ship owners 
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financially liable for all property loss, injury and death resulting from maritime 
crime in order to boost the incentive to protect crewmembers.  
Alternatively, arming crewmembers sounds like a more expedient method 
to thwart off would-be pirates or even terrorists, but the process would not be that 
simple.  Besides the legal impediments, there are practical barriers.  Most crews 
are hired from third world countries.  In addition to background checks, the 
crewmembers would require weapons training.  The current condition of the 
hiring and credentialing system certainly would not allow for such an initiative.   
But deploying trained security teams onboard high value ships transiting high risk 
waters could be effective.  The security team concept may also be employed on 
high-risk vessels, such as LNG tankers or ammonium nitrate carriers, entering 
U.S. ports.247   
C. CONCLUSION 
The maritime domain presents an extremely formidable security challenge 
for the United States.  On the macro-level, the trade-offs between economic and 
security concerns must be balanced.  Since access to the maritime system is 
virtually unlimited, foreign economic and security interests must be aligned with 
U.S. interests if long-term, effective partnerships in the GWOT are to be 
achieved.  The United States along with other nations and multinational 
communities have promoted a series of global security measures to secure 
economic interests.  9/11 and the U.S. GWOT efforts have placed cooperative 
maritime security policy issues on the international table.  Global and regional 
dialogues have provided a start for solving sovereignty sensitivities and 
overcoming jurisdictional boundaries, but there is still much to be accomplished.  
In substantial regard, sea piracy and its concerned mechanisms like the IMB, 
IMO and ASEAN, have provided a framework for transitioning discussion and 
security policies from anti-crime to counter-terrorism, especially in Southeast 
Asia.   
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In more terrorist and pirate prone regions, such as Southeast Asia, the 
United States and powers such as Japan have undertaken capacity building 
initiatives to improve maritime security and cooperation.  By conflating the 
prevention of piracy and other economically driven crime and with counter-
terrorism measures on the tactical level, the interests of the United States and 
regional actors have been reasonably aligned.  Though incentive-based 
programs and partnerships have demonstrated potential to influence maritime 
security participation, challenges still remain in ensuring compliance, sharing 
information and costs, and cooperating in operations.  To meet some of these 
challenges, the United States and other nations have embarked in various 
operations and training exercises.  Sea piracy and its associated tactics have 
provided much of the impetus for security plans and operational procedures in 
these maritime environs.   
On the home front, maritime security strategists are well apprised of the 
threat of piracy but until 9/11, the U.S. paid little heed to maritime crime.  9/11 
opened America’s eyes not only to the threat of terror, but also to the inherent 
vulnerabilities of the nation.  Today, the increase in violence, organization, and 
technological dexterity of pirates serves as a harbinger of tactics that terrorists 
may potentially employ.  The National Strategy for Maritime Security attempts to 
thwart all potential threats including piracy, by coordinating foreign, commercial, 
and government entities into a unified security effort.  Much progress has been 
made, but if the United States is to accomplish the primary goal of preventing a 
cataclysmic maritime attack, then policy shortcomings must be addressed.  
America must shrink the immense areas of ungoverned or weakly controlled sea 
space, must promote maritime security as being in the best interest of all trading 
partners, must control the accessibility and limit the vulnerability of the maritime 
system, and must remove the barriers to effective maritime security operations. 
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APPENDIX A.  TECHNOLOGICAL SECURITY INITIATIVES 
A. AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS) 
AIS equipment sends vessel tracking information to other ships and shore-
based agencies.  Currently, AIS has been decreed mandatory by IMO mandatory 
only on international vessels weighing over 300 gross tons, but requirements 
expansion is being discussed.   
B. AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM (ATS) 
The Custom and Border Protection ATS is located in the National 
Targeting Center.  ATS uses pre-arrival information and intelligence community 
inputs to identify high-risk targets prior to arrival. ATS standardizes bill of lading 
and entry summary data received from the Automated Commercial System and 
creates integrated records called “shipments.”  Shipments are evaluated and 
scored by the ATS using over 300 weighted rules and inputs from Customs 
personnel.  The higher the shipment score, the more attention warranted.248 
C. DEEPWATER 
The USCG bundles its entire acquisition strategy under the Deepwater 
plan.  Billed as a system of systems, Deepwater was re-baselined and 
broadened after 9-11 to meet homeland security needs.  In addition to platforms 
like Fast Response and Offshore Patrol Cutters, helicopters, and airplanes, 
Deepwater focuses on improving interoperability of all USCG assets and 
telecommunications systems.  In FY2005, the USCG requested an additional 
$227 million [increase from $1 billion] for C4ISR initiatives to integrate port 
commanders into the Common Operating Picture (COP) and expand MDA data 
sharing among participants.249  Besides increasing membership, the MDA 
system is also expanding coverage.  The USCG hopes to obtain COP coverage 
out to 2,000 nautical miles by integrating its own Deepwater sensors with other 
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systems, such as AIS and Shiploc.250  The USCG is evaluating the installation of 
AIS receivers and other sensors on platforms varying from satellites to UAVs, 
from buoys to oilrigs, and from commercial airliners to airships.251  
D. HARBOR CRAFT TRANSPONDER SYSTEM (HARTS) / VESSEL 
TRAFFIC SYSTEM (VTS) 
To further enhance the security of Singapore’s port waters, the Maritime 
and Port Authority of Singapore, Police Coast Guard and Republic Singapore 
Navy are implementing a system called HARTS. HARTS will enable the security 
agencies to identify and track the movements of all powered harbor and pleasure 
craft inside Singapore port waters. The installation of HARTS transponder on 
harbor and pleasure craft is currently in progress and will be completed by end of 
Dec 2006.  In the United States, the USCG’s radar tracking VTS is active in four 
major ports - New York, Puget Sound (Seattle), San Francisco, and 
Houston/Galveston.252 
E. MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE 
The Department of Energy (DOE) initiative that installs radiation portal 
monitors in major world ports is known as the Megaports Initiative.   
F. NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION (NII) 
CBP officers employ Non-intrusive Inspection technologies at ports of 
entry.  Handheld radiation detectors, large-scale gamma-ray, neutron scanning, 
and X-ray imaging systems, and other tools are used to screen cargo for 
contraband and WMD’s.  100 percent of U.S. ports are expected to have 
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G. OPERATION DRYDOCK 
Operation Drydock seeks to clean up the mariner documentation process 
by completing background criminal checks before issuing credentials.  Other 
identification systems are being pursued under the International Labor 
Organizations Sea Farers Identity Documents Convention 2003, such as a bar-
coded biometrics verification system with stored fingerprint details. 
H. OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE (OSC) 
OSC is a government-private industry partnership which funds private-
sector pilot programs that secure supply chains, validate shipments, or monitor 
movement and integrity of cargo.  OSC programs are technology-based.  The 
three largest U.S. container zones - port complexes of Los Angeles and long 
Beach, Seattle and Tacoma, and New York and New Jersey - have each 
instituted OSC.253 
I. SECURE FREIGHT INITIATIVE 
The Secure Freight Initiative seeks to upgrade the information about cargo 
and contents inside containers. 
J. SECURE-SHIP 
Secure-ship is a non-lethal, electrified fence that surrounds a ship when 
anchored.  The fence uses a 9000-volt current to deter boarding attempts.  The 
fence contains a tamper alarm which sets off a siren and activates floodlights.  
The collapsible fence assembles and dismantles quickly, and includes a gate for 
launching small craft or lowering a gangway.  The fence is not compatible with 
flammable cargoes. 
K. SHIP SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM 
Ship Security Alert System allows operator to send covert alert to shore in 
case of an act of violence such as piracy or terrorism.  ISPS requires passenger 
and cargo ships of at least 500 GT to have the equipment.   
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L. SHIPLOC 
Shiploc is a tracking system used to recover hijacked vessels.  The 
system uses satellite tracking and can be monitored via the Internet.  The system 
allows crews to send an emergency signal when threatened.  There are a 
number of tracking alternatives on the market; Shiploc is provided as one 
example.   
M. SMART BOX 
 After containers are inspected, the Smart Box program affixes a “tamper 
evident” seal and an electronic “tamper deterrence” device to the container door.  
If the container door is opened after sealing, the Smart Box device will reflect the 
intrusion.254  Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are also available for 
container tracking.   
N. SOUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (SOSUS) 
The Navy is investigating the integration of its deep-ocean SOSUS and 
experimenting with shallow water acoustic systems.  Integration of operational 
systems like those being developed to detect submarines is also in the mix.255 
O. SURVEILLANCE AND C4ISR 
Imagery systems and other space-based “overhead” initiatives are being 
researched by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency.  Other government agencies such as the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Lawrence Livermore National Lab, and the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Center are conducting technology assessments, 
field experiments, and war games to enhance MDA, identify best practices, and 
educate the maritime community.256   
In-port underwater surveillance methods, such as robot operated vehicles 
and stationary inspection stations, are being investigated.257 
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P. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 
There are numerous UAV initiatives being planned by U.S. government 
agencies such as the Navy and USCG, and private organizations.  For example, 
the Inventus UAV is a reconnaissance system which can be launched from land 
or sea vessels.  Inventus sends a camera image back to the ground station 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
9/11  September 11, 2001 (Terrorist Attacks on the United States) 
 
AIS  Automatic Identification System 
AMMTC  ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
APEC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperative 
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASC  ASEAN Security Community 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASG  Abu Sayyaf Group 
ATS  Automated Targeting System 
 
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
CBP  Customs and Border Protection 
CMT  Combating Maritime Terrorism 
COP  Common Operating Picture  
CSCAP  Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
CSI  Container Security Initiative 
C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
CWS  Coast Watch South 
 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DOE  Department of Energy 
DOJ  Department of Justice 
DOS  Department of State 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
DPW  Dubai Ports World  
 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FPDA  Five Power Defense Arrangement 
FMF  Foreign Military Financing 
FTA  Trade Free Area 
 
GAM  Free Aceh Movement  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GT  Gross Tons 
GWOT Global War on Terror 
 
ICC   International Chamber of Commerce  
ICE  Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
ICG  Indonesian Coast Guard 
IED  Improvised Explosive Devices 
IMB  International Maritime Bureau   
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IMO  International Maritime Organization  
ISPS  International Ship and Port Facility Security 
 
JHOC  Joint Harbor Operations Centers 
JI  Jemaah Islamiyah 
JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force - West 
JWC  Joint War Committee 
 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LTTE   Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
 
MDA  Maritime Domain Awareness 
MECC Maritime Enforcement Coordination Center 
MIFC  Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers 
MILF  Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MMEA Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
MOTR Maritime Operational Threat Response 
MPAT  Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team 
MSRT  Maritime Security Response Teams 
MSSI  Malacca Straits Security Initiative  
MSST  Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
MTSA  Maritime Transportation Security Act 
 
NII   Non-intrusive Inspection  
NM  Nautical Miles 
NOA  Notice of Arrival 
NORTHCOM United States Northern Command 
NSMS  National Strategy for Maritime Security 
NTC  National Targeting Center  
NVD  Night Vision Devices  
 
OSAC  Overseas Security Advisory Council 
OSC  Operation Safe Commerce  
 
PACOM United States Pacific Command 
PRC  Piracy Reporting Center 
PSG  Port Security Grant 
PSI  Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-piracy 
RMMP Royal Malaysian Marine Police 
RMN  Royal Malaysian Navy 
RMSI  Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
RPG  Rocket Propelled Grenades 
RTN  Royal Thai Navy 
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SAM  Surface-to-air Missile 
SAR  Search and Rescue 
SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation against Terrorism 
SLOC  Sea Lines of Communication 
SOLAS  Safety of Life at Sea (Convention)  
STAR  Secure Trade in the APEC Region 
SUA  Suppression of Unlawful Acts (Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation) 
 
TCP  Trilateral Coordinated Patrol 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration 
TWIC   Transportation Workers Identity Card  
 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
 
VAP  Vientiane Programme  
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